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Preface
Environmental ethics is often classified as a branch of applied ethics, putting it on par with such 
fields as bioethics, medical ethics,  business ethics, and military ethics, to name just a few. This is  
misleading  in  the  extreme.  Like  the  environment  itself,  the  field  touches  everything,  permeating 
countless  other  areas  of  philosophy  and  with  thinkers  today in  almost  every  major  philosophical 
tradition,  from  analytic  to  continental  philosophers,  feminist  theorists,  Eastern  philosophers,  and 
theologians from a wide variety of religious perspectives—Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, 
Taoist, and Native American. The majority of these thinkers seek to do more than prescribe remedies to 
issues  such  as  global  warming  or  factory  farming  in  the  austere  and  remote  language  of  ethical 
principles. They want to completely rethink and redefine our conception of  nature, of how we perceive 
ourselves in relation to it, and of what brings meaning and goodness to our lives and to the universe at 
large. At its heart, environmental ethics is not a field of applied ethics, but a search for a different way 
of thinking, living, and being.
Questions about what beings do or do not deserve our moral consideration fall less into the 
sphere of applied ethics and more into what is called metaethics, a difficult philosophical field which 
addresses questions such as the semantics and epistemology of morality, metaphysical issues such as 
whether morality is objective or subjective, absolute or relative, and questions pertaining to the nature 
of value. We might say that metaethics is to ethics as metaphysics is to physics; it comes before ethics  
(surprising, considering that meta is the Greek word for “after”) and forms the underlying structure or 
background upon which an ethical theory can sustain itself.  A great deal of the earlier literature in 
environmental ethics, most of it from the 1970s and 80s, dealt more with metaethical questions than 
with applied ethics. One of the most frequent issues dealt with—and words used—was value. Who or 
what possessed it? What was its ontology? How could it  be known? As soon as they asked these 
questions,  environmental  philosophers  began  to  engage  vigorously  and  articulately  in  metaethics, 
perhaps even inventing a new subdiscipline of philosophy in the process, one which might be called 
“environmental metaethics.”
As these discussions began, the phrase “intrinsic value” very quickly came into vogue, along 
with similar-sounding phrases such as “intrinsic worth,” “inherent value,” and “inherent worth,” among 
others. The term was treated as the antonym of “instrumental value,” the value something has only as a 
means  to  an  end.  Environmental  philosophers  were  looking  for  a  shield;  they  wanted  a  way  of 
defending the nonhuman world from those who prized it only for its instrumental value, and intrinsic  
value, ironically, was their means to that end.
This is a project about value and nature, though its scope extends well beyond the topics that 
those words connote. It also deals with subjects in metaphysics, moral psychology, and epistemology, 
among  others.  In  the  past,  my  philosophy  professors  have  suggested  that  I  try  to  avoid  doing 
philosophy with a “surgical knife,” so to speak, and take a more “holistic” approach toward things. I 
agree, and the upshot of my essay is a theory of value that is most certainly holistic. There are times, 
however, when we cannot see the whole until we first find the pieces, so that is what I have tried to do. 
With luck, the outcome will be of some value—which kind of value is a question I leave up to the  
reader.
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Introduction: Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Intrinsic Value
Since the emergence of environmental ethics as a subdiscipline of philosophy, it has often 
been argued that the moral standing of nonhuman beings1 requires us to defend a theory of intrinsic 
value. As early as the 1940s, Aldo Leopold, in his landmark essay “The Land Ethic,” wrote that “[i]t 
is inconceivable . . . that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration 
for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than 
mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense.”2 Decades later, in an important 
1981 essay titled “The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic,” Tom Regan argued that 
“the development of what can properly be called an environmental ethic requires that we postulate 
inherent value in nature” and that an environmental ethic that failed to do so would regress into a 
“management ethic.”3 General agreement followed. As Dale Jamieson recollects,
[t]o be an environmental ethicist one had to embrace new values. One had to believe 
that some non-sentient entities have inherent value; that these entities include such 
collectives as species, ecosystems, and the community of the land; and that value is 
mind-independent in the following respect: even if there were no conscious beings, 
aspects of nature would still be inherently valuable.4
 More specifically, what these philosophers were looking for was an environmental ethic that 
was nonanthropocentric, one that did not construe humans as the only morally significant beings in 
the universe. Their goal was to defend an ethic that provided for the moral standing5 of nonhuman 
nature as opposed to only humans, and it was assumed that the only way to do this was to supply 
some sort of condition upon which natural entities could possess that moral standing. Without such 
1 From  this  point  on,  the  term  "nonhuman"  should  be  understood  to  include  "natural"  things  such  as  animals 
(excluding  humans),  plants,  fungi,  microorganisms,  collectives  such  as  species  (excluding  homo  sapiens)  and 
ecosystems, landscapes, wilderness areas, and natural objects. It does not include artifacts, artworks, or cities. Some 
may debate whether these things are always natural, for example, in the case of domestic animals or plants grown by 
humans or ecosystems that have been largely altered by human influences, but this is not a debate I wish to entertain 
at  this  time.  The  distinction,  even  if  it  is  questionable,  is  necessary  in  any discussion  that  involves  the  term 
"anthropocentrism": anthropocentrism is understood as any ethical view that priviliges humans over the supposedly 
"natural" world.
2  Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford UP, 1987), 223.
3  Tom Regan, "The Nature and Possibility of An Environmental Ethic," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 19-34.
4  Dale Jamieson, Morality’s Progress (New York, Oxford UP, 2002), 201.
5  Tom Regan defines “moral standing” as follows: “X has moral standing if and only if  X is a being such that we 
morally ought to determine how X will be affected in the course of determining whether we ought to perform a  
given act or adopt a given policy” See Regan, “Nature and Possibility,” 19.
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a condition, it  was supposed, anthropocentrism was inevitable.  Only by proving that nonhuman 
nature  was  intrinsically  valuable  could  anthropocentrism  be  quashed  once  and  for  all.  And 
furthermore, only by determining which things had intrinsic value and which did not could one then 
determine where to draw the line for moral consideration: did only sentient animals have moral 
standing? Could nonsentient organisms such as plants possess it as well? Did collectives such as 
ecosystems and species? Did nonliving objects such as rocks and waterfalls? Did intrinsic value 
belong  to  natural  entities  specifically,  or  rather  to  certain  capacities  of  those  entities  such  as 
happiness or flourishing? Answering these questions would supposedly allow us to determine the 
scope and details of our moral obligations.
My focus will be on the most fundamental of the questions above: do we need a theory of 
intrinsic value in order to  defend a nonanthropocentric  environmental  ethic? It  is  still  common 
among many environmental ethicists to assume that we do, and furthermore, that anyone opposed to 
intrinsic value is probably in favor of some species of anthropocentrism (pun not intended). This 
assumption has been fueled by such philosophers as Bryan Norton, who abandons the concept of 
intrinsic value and defends a doctrine of “weak anthropocentrism,” arguing that the quest to locate 
intrinsic value is impractical, and that some kind of responsible, human-centered ethic is a more 
useful means of developing sound environmental policies.6 Similarly,  Andrew Light argues that 
debates  over  intrinsic  value  have  impeded  more  practical  discussions  that  could  lead  to  the 
development of effective environmental policy and that an appeal to human interests could help 
encourage more of the reform that environmentalists seek.7 Rebuttals to such arguments generally 
seem to take place under the strong belief that intrinsic value is vital to the idea that we should care 
morally about  nature.  In what  follows, I  argue the opposite:  that we do not  need a concept  of 
intrinsic value in order to defend a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic.
By no means am I the first to do this. Dale Jamieson, for example, argues that even if the 
6  Bryan G. Norton, “Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism,” Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 131-148.
7  Andrew Light, “Contemporary Environmental Ethics: From Metaethics to Public Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy 33 
(2002): 426-449.
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concept  of  intrinsic  value  is  problematic,  we  may  still  speak  of  the  ways  in  which  people  
“intrinsically value” things, which occurs when they “value [them] for [their] own sake.”8 Anthony 
Weston urges that we should understand values as pluralistic and interrelated, situated within the 
various relationships that we have to and within nature, and that we ought to avoid the temptation to 
seek some sort of “grounding” for environmental values.9 Similarly, certain ecofeminists, such as 
Karen Warren, argue that it is the unique relationships humans share with nature that allows us to 
understand our moral obligations to the nonhuman world, not “reductionist” views that base moral 
considerability  upon  certain  properties  or  features  of  a  being.10 These  views  are  certainly  not 
without their differences, but what all of them have in common is a shift away from a kind of 
foundationalist  or deductive view of  moral  epistemology,  one upon which moral  obligations  to 
nature follow logically from some sort of feature or attribute of a thing, towards one in which our 
moral relations to nonhuman nature arise from the way we respond to and situate ourselves within  
it.
This is the sort of view I am leaning toward. Defending it is no simple matter, however, and 
this paper, as a result, is broad in its scope. In the first chapter, I identify and discuss some different  
uses of the term “intrinsic value,” both within and outside environmental ethics. After all, the term 
did not originate within the literature on environmental ethics; the popularity of the phrase among 
contemporary philosophers  can  probably be  credited  to  the  work  of  G.  E.  Moore,  particularly 
Principia  Ethica,  and  the  idea  has  been  around  in  some form or  another  since  ancient  times. 
Aristotle,  for  instance,  devoted  much of  his  ethical  work  to  discussing  “the  highest  good”  (to 
agathon ariston in Greek, which more literally translates as “best good”) at  which all practical 
endeavors—arts and crafts, sciences, and politics, for example—ought to be directed.11 Medieval 
philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas wrote of a divine or theological goodness which all other 
8  Jamieson, Morality’s Progress, 206.
9  Anthony Weston, “Beyond Intrinsic Value,” in Environmental Pragmatism, ed. Andrew Light and Eric Katz (New 
York: Routledge 1996), 298-306.
10  Karen J. Warren, “The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism,” in People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees, ed. 
Christine Pierce and Donald VanDeveer (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1995), 218.
11 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Oswald (Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), 4.
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good things were to be employed in pursuit of, a concept described by Boethius throughout his 
work  as  a  summum bonum (Latin  for  “highest  good”).  David  Hume described  the  idea  of  an 
“ultimate  end,”  a  thing  regarded  as  good  by human  beings  for  no  purpose  other  than  itself.12 
Immanuel Kant, in his  Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, described a good will as “good 
without qualification,” noting that although qualities such as intellect, courage, or diligence were 
good, they were good only for the sake of some further end and, indeed, could be employed in the 
pursuit of very bad ends; later in the  Grounding he also used the term “intrinsic worth” (innerer  
Wert in German, with “Wert” intentionally capitalized) to describe the same concept.13 The term also 
appears in John Locke's  Second Treatise of Government  to describe things people desire despite 
their apparent uselessness, such as gold.14 Though these ideas are not without their differences, all 
of them get at the fundamental notion of a good or end that is good not for or because of anything 
but, as a child might say,  just because.  The notion does not owe itself to any of these particular 
philosophers, but seems to crop up in philosophical thinking simply because of how intuitive it is. 
Even those of us who do not study philosophy have probably thought of something similar at one 
time or another—as Shelly Kagan writes, though the term “intrinsic value” sounds like jargon to 
most  people's  ears,  “it  also  seems  plausible  to  me  that  when  philosophers  introduce  the  term 
'intrinsic value'  they are attempting to provide a label for a concept that does occur in ordinary 
thought, even if it only occurs implicitly and without a common label.”15 Indeed, every culture, past 
and present, has probably had some notion of intrinsic value, a fact Friederich Nietzsche might have 
been getting at in the chapter of Thus Spake Zarathustra titled “The Thousand and One Goals.”16
Chapter one, then, addresses some distinct uses of this term, primarily as it is employed in 
contemporary analytic philosophy and environmental ethics. The term is often used in two senses: 
12 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B.Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 
87.
13 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 3rd ed., trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1993), 10.
14 Locke, John, Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Tom Crawford (Mineola, NY: 
Dover, 2002), 17
15 Shelly Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value," The Journal of Ethics 2, no. 4 (1998): 277.
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. Thomas Common (New York: Random House, 19--), 72-75.
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goodness  that  is  noninstrumental,  that  is  to  say,  not  good  merely as  a  means  for  the  sake  of 
something else, but for its own sake; and goodness that is an intrinsic property, a specific kind of 
metaphysical attribute belonging to certain objects, often in virtue of other traits. Some intrinsic-
value views—indeed, many—employ the term to mean both of these things, and so in 1.i I address 
the theory of intrinsic value devised by Tom Regan and discussed in his 1981 paper, mentioned at 
the beginning of this introduction, “The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic.” I note a 
number of issues with his conception of intrinsic value, and argue that among them is a problem 
related to moral psychology: that Regan's intrinsic-value view describes a concept so insubstantial 
that it cannot serve as a source of moral motivation, even if the thing described in his conception 
exists. Moral motivation, whatever its nature, must, like any kind of motivation, have causal roots, 
and intrinsic value provides none.
The rest of the paper is an attempt to devise an alternative theory of value that compensates 
for this issue. I start by taking a brief look at noncognitivist views and argue that none of them 
provides a preferable alternative to intrinsic-value views; I argue that moral sentences, including 
sentences  about  a  thing's  value,  can and do express  beliefs,  not  mere feelings or  prescriptions. 
Emotivists, however, are onto something when they note the almost undeniable correlation between 
moral sentences and feelings, so in chapter three I attempt to explain how sentiment can contribute 
to moral belief,  trying as best  I  can to argue for a view that is not anti-rational.  I  address and 
criticize the moral psychology of David Hume, who argues that the desire to act morally follows 
directly from our sentimental reactions to things; I argue instead that such desires are motivated by 
beliefs, that the beliefs are formed from sentiments, and that sentiment can actually assist us in 
forming true moral beliefs. As I speak of those beliefs, I will generally have in mind beliefs about 
the value of things, which I call evaluations, and which are distinct from beliefs about what one 
ought to do, which I call directives.17 I conclude the chapter with a tentative diagram of the relation 
17 Terms borrowed from David Wiggins. See Wiggins: "Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life." In Essays on 
Moral Realism, edited by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP), 133.
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between sentiment, evaluations, moral beliefs, and morally motivated actions.
Such an account demands that I explain how evaluations can be true and justified, so chapter 
four  addresses  epistemological  issues.  I  endorse  coherentism  in  both  truth  and  knowledge,  a 
contentious  move which  requires  me to  make some rather  weighty remarks  on the  value  of  a 
correspondence theory of truth, which, along with thinkers like Richard Rorty, I reject. I briefly 
describe a position called “representational realism,” which involves the idea that we can have a 
conception of a real world without having to solve skepticism or speak about things-in-themselves. 
In chapter five, I discuss the metaphysics of value, endorsing what are called “sensibility theories,” 
a word often used to describe the metaethical views of John McDowell and David Wiggins. I then 
address the question of what property or set of properties qualifies something for our valuation, 
arguing  that  the  answer  is  best  revealed  through  experience  and  discourse.  The  means-end 
distinction is also briefly called into question.
Broad as these topics are, all of them are addressed with a single goal in mind: to discover  
whether  a  nonanthropocentric  environmental  ethic  is  compatible  with  the  rejection  of  intrinsic 
value. Much of the essay does not deal explicitly with environmental ethics. Indeed, chapters two 
through  four  do  not  even  mention  it.  No  area  of  philosophy  is  isolated  from  others,  and 
environmental ethics is no exception. The conclusion, however, will return to the topic and remark 
on how we might re-approach the subject of environmental ethics in light of the discoveries made in 
this project. Following the conclusion, the reader should also look for an addendum, which briefly 
addresses the question of whether we can—and should—endorse a theory of intrinsic value for 
pragmatic reasons, if any can be found, and whether such an endorsement is compatible with the 
theory I have outlined. Oddly enough, as I wrote this essay, the question did not seem to fit into any 
particular section, so I have decided to treat it as an afterthought, a point to ponder, and a valuable  
one (though perhaps not intrinsically) at that.
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(1) A Breakdown of Intrinsic Value
The concept of intrinsic value is difficult to analyze. This is because of the different kinds of  
ways the term has been used within both environmental ethics and moral philosophy in general; 
philosophers  who  use  the  term are  not  necessarily  referring  to  the  same  idea.  There  are  two 
prominent senses of the term, however, that especially concern us. The first is perhaps the most 
literal sense of the term: value that is an intrinsic property of something. G. E. Moore is probably 
the most well known defender of this version of intrinsic value. On Moore’s view, “[t]o say that a 
kind of value is ‘intrinsic’ means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what 
degree it possesses it,  depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.”  18 Moore 
elaborates  on  this  definition  with  the  following  two  points:  first,  that  anything  that  possesses 
intrinsic value possesses it necessarily,  so long as it possesses other properties from which that  
intrinsic value follows, and that this value does not depend on any contextual factors such as time, 
location, or other relational circumstances; and second, that if something possesses intrinsic value, 
so must anything that is identical (or perhaps very similar) to it.19 In the dictionary sense, “intrinsic” 
describes features that do not vary depending on something’s relations with other things, but that 
rely solely on other intrinsic features of that thing; Moore’s definition seems to satisfy this meaning.
A much more common, if less literal, use of the term “intrinsic value” describes a kind of 
value that something has irrespective of its instrumental value, the utility it possesses for achieving 
a certain end. This idea is generally described in terms such as the following: a thing has intrinsic 
value if it is valuable or good “as an end,”20 for its “own sake,”21 or if it is “prima facie worthy of 
being preserved or promoted,”22 among other, similar terms. The language here seems to echo the 
third formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity,  
18 G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (London: Oxford UP, 1965), 260. Note that Moore believes that intrinsic value 
can vary by degree and belongs to  a wide range of  objects  and entities.  Not all  philosophers  share this  view, 
particularly those defending certain kinds of moral egalitarianism, such as Regan.
19 Ibid., 260-261.
20  Christine Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 169-195.
21  Shelly Kagan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” The Journal of Ethics 2 (1998): 279
22  Paul Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature,” in People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees, ed. Christine Pierce and 
Donald VanDeveer (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995), 128.
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whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and 
never simply as a means.”23 We regard as a mere means that which has only instrumental value, but 
if a thing has intrinsic value, then we assume it possesses value as an end, value that is not reducible 
to or contingent upon its value as a means. Nature is useful, but if things in nature have intrinsic  
value, then we cannot do with them anything we please, at least not prima facie.
The  difference  between  these  two uses  of  the  term “intrinsic  value”  is  that  the  first  is 
metaphysical while the second is normative: to claim, as Moore does, that intrinsic value depends 
on the intrinsic nature of a thing is to say something about the source or structure of that value; on 
the other hand, to claim that the value of something entails that it is good “as an end,” for example, 
is to say something about the way we ought to treat that thing. Arguably, the two definitions are 
compatible; many philosophers who accept that something has value as an end assume further that 
such value is an intrinsic property. Yet at the same time, the two definitions involve ideas that seem 
to fall into distinctly different categories. Moore’s definition is entirely descriptive—it tells us what 
is—but the other definition tells us something different: it tells us what we ought to do.
The distinctive meaning of the two senses is further illustrated by how they contrast with 
other terms. It  has already been noted that the second sense of “intrinsic value” contrasts with 
“instrumental value.” The same cannot be said about Moore’s usage of the term, which instead 
contrasts with “extrinsic value.” Whereas an intrinsic property refers to non-relational features of a 
thing, such as volume or mass, extrinsic properties are qualities a thing has based on relations, such 
as distance or weight (in the latter case, there is a relation between an object’s mass and another  
object’s gravitational pull). As David Lewis elaborates,
[a]  sentence  or  statement  or  proposition  that  ascribes  intrinsic  properties  to 
something is entirely about that thing; whereas an ascription of extrinsic properties is 
something not entirely about that thing, though it may well be about some larger 
whole which includes that thing as part.24
23 Kant, Grounding, 38. The Formula of Humanity As an End is often mistaken to be the second formulation of Kant's 
Categorical Imperative, but it is, in fact, the third. The second formulation is the Formula of the Law of Nature. See  
Grounding, 30.
24  David Lewis, “Extrinsic Properties,” Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 197.
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Working off of this definition, we understand that extrinsic value is a kind of value that 
would not depend solely on a thing’s intrinsic properties, but that can exist only given the properties 
of other things. It bears emphasizing that although instrumental value is a kind of extrinsic value, by 
no means is extrinsic value necessarily instrumental, at least not by definition. Equally important, it 
must be emphasized that to say something has value “as an end,” value “for its own sake,” or that  
its value makes it “prima facie worthy of being preserved or promoted” by no means entails that 
such value is an intrinsic property. Certainly one may argue this, yet even if it were true, such a 
statement would be synthetic, not analytic; nothing in the definition of value “for its own sake” 
implies that such value is an intrinsic property.
How should we begin to resolve this confusion? Christine Korsgaard has made a useful 
distinction that I believe helps us: she distinguishes intrinsic value in the Moorean sense from value 
as an end, on the one hand, and extrinsic value from value as a means or instrumental value, on the 
other.25 “Intrinsic  and  instrumental  good,”  explains  Korsgaard,  “should  not  be  treated  as 
correlatives, because they belong to two different distinctions.”26 The same presumably applies to 
value as an end and extrinsic value. Korsgaard’s point helps to clarify that some philosophers are 
not correctly using the word “intrinsic” when they contrast it with instrumental value, even though 
they  may  incidentally  hold  that  value  as  an  end  is  an  intrinsic  property.  A further  point  of 
Korsgaard’s is that we are not limited to conceiving of value as an end as intrinsic; as Korsgaard 
notes, such value may very well be extrinsic.27
A number of environmental philosophers seem not to acknowledge Korsgaard’s distinction. 
Holmes Rolston, III, for example, blatantly contrasts intrinsic value with instrumental value.28 He 
then goes on to define intrinsic value as value that is objective rather than subjective.29 Clearly this 
is the kind of erroneous distinction that Korsgaard wants us to avoid. My point, however, in noting 
25  Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions,” 170. 
26  Ibid., 170. It should be noted that Korsgaard prefers to use the terms “goodness” and “good” in place of “value” and 
“valuable.”
27  Ibid., 172-173.
28  Holmes Rolston, III, “Are Values in Nature Objective or Subjective?” Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 145.
29  Ibid., 147-148.
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this  distinction  is  not  that  we  should  chastise  philosophers  for  improper  usage  of  the  word 
“intrinsic.” Indeed, one may argue that so many philosophers have used the term “intrinsic value” to 
mean value that is noninstrumental that the term has simply taken on a second meaning. If this is so, 
then  we  need  to  acknowledge  it  when  critiquing  the  term.  Critics  of  intrinsic  value  appear 
sometimes to fail in doing this, or at least fail to specify which sense of the term they are attacking.  
If Korsgaard is right, some of the so-called “intrinsic” value views that appear in environmental 
ethics,  specifically,  the  kinds  that  construe  the  value  of  nonhuman  entities  as  noninstrumental 
without mention of whether such value is an intrinsic property, could in fact be compatible with 
extrinsic value. They might not have the same appeal to human interests that Norton and Light think 
are necessary for an environmental ethic to succeed, but they may still avoid the “reductionist” 
character that philosophers such as Weston and Warren want to avoid.
A circumspect account of intrinsic value in nature will mention both of these features; it will 
specify that the value required for the moral standing of nonhuman entities is value such that it 
behooves us to treat such things as ends in themselves and not mere means, but such an account will 
tell us furthermore that such value is an intrinsic property. An account that fails to do the latter is 
incomplete—question-begging, almost—since it bases the claim that we have moral obligations to 
something on the claim that it is worthy of those obligations (not intrinsically worthy, mind you, 
since it does not specify that that worthiness is an intrinsic property). We can leave the normative 
definition aside, then, since there is not much to criticize, and redirect our attention to the literal 
definition. This definition tells us only that value is an intrinsic property of something. It does not 
tell us anything beyond that.
1.i. A Metaphysical Critique of Intrinsic Value
Two problems immediately raise their heads when we speak of values as intrinsic features of 
things  in  the  world.  The  first  is  skepticism  about  values:  if  there  are  indeed  values  residing 
intrinsically in certain objects, it  is difficult to understand how we would know if they existed. 
Certain philosophers address this problem by treating intrinsic value as a theory or, to use Tom 
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Regan's words, a “postulate”;30 perhaps one cannot demonstrate that intrinsic value exists, but it is 
still  worth  considering  the  logical  implications  that  would  follow  if  it  did.  Nevertheless,  the 
skeptical problem still persists, and with another consequence as well; not only are we unable to 
know whether intrinsic value exists, we also do not know which objects do and do not possess it, 
which has led to irresolvable controversy among environmental ethicists. Philosophers debate with 
each  other  whether  intrinsic  value  belongs  only  to  sentient  animals,  to  mental  states  such  as 
pleasure,  to states of affairs like diversity or flourishing, to collectives such as ecosystems and 
species, or to individual organisms alone. The ad-hoc strategy of postulating intrinsic value, then, 
seems a weak solution if a consensus cannot be reached on which things possess it and which do 
not.
The second problem is the is-ought problem, originally articulated by David Hume.31 Even if 
we were able to successfully determine which things possessed intrinsic value, how would it follow 
that we have moral obligations toward them? Granted they possess a certain property, an intrinsic 
feature  of  some unusual  kind.  Yet  how does  this  property provide  us  a  reason to  regard them 
morally—what makes true the conditional statement “If something has intrinsic value, we ought to 
treat it  morally”? Is  the mere possession of intrinsic value enough to grant this  statement truth 
value?  Is  intrinsic  value  synonymous  with  moral  standing?  This  is  dubious;  intrinsic  value  is 
supposedly a  necessary and sufficient  condition  of  moral  standing,  and the  two should  not  be 
conflated. Is it perhaps that the word “value” automatically implies moral standing, as though by 
definition? Surely this can be disputed and seems a rather lazy solution. Unless Hume's is-ought 
problem can be defeated, then even if we were to successfully prove the existence of intrinsic value 
in certain things, the outcome would be anticlimactic.
Value-skepticism and the is-ought problem are probably the two most obvious objections to 
intrinsic-value views. I should like to add a third, one which, I think, goes hand-in-hand with the 
30 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 2004 ed. (Berkeley: UC Press, 2004), 247
31 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 2, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1898), 245-246.
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first two but is not quite the same. The problem is as follows: to value something, e.g., to value it 
morally, is to have a kind of reaction to it. Valuation, then, is the result of a causal relationship  
between features of the valued object and the valuing agent. It must therefore be possible for those 
features or properties of the object to interact causally with the agent's mental faculties. Traditional 
accounts of intrinsic value, however, do not present us with a property that seems able to do this. 
The problem is that intrinsic value is a weak concept; philosophers who defend the idea make it  
unclear what precisely is being predicated when we describe something as intrinsically valuable. 
Predicates  such  as  “big,”  “green,”  and  “alive”  give  us  clear  information  about  an  object  and, 
assuming of course that we did not know at first that the object possessed those properties, tell us 
something new about it. Does the same work when we predicate “intrinsic value” of something? Let 
us being to answer that question by looking at a paradigmatic account of intrinsic value, the one 
argued for by Regan in 1981. Regan makes the following five remarks on what a successful account 
of intrinsic value would include:32
First, such value must be “independent of any awareness, interest, or appreciation of it by 
any conscious being.”33 In a word, it would be  mind-independent: it would exist even if nobody 
were around to acknowledge it.  G. E.  Moore makes the same remark about intrinsic value;  he 
proposes an “isolation test,” in which we imagine a universe containing only one thing and decide 
whether or not that universe would be better if the thing existed than if it did not exist.34 Similarly, 
Richard Sylvan has us  imagine a scenario in which the last  human being on earth goes  about 
destroying the entire ecosystem; if we judge that the world after the last human’s death would be 
better if the ecosystem were still around, then, according to Sylvan, we are ascribing intrinsic value 
to the ecosystem.35 Values must be in nature; they cannot be in the head.
32 Note that throughout the corpus of his writing, Regan, himself an animal rights theorist, has been highly skeptical of  
the possibility that non-conscious entities such as plants or collectives such as ecosystems can possess intrinsic 
value.
33  Regan, “Nature and Possibility,” 30.
34  Qtd. in Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions,” 176.
35  Richard Sylvan (Routley), “Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?” in Environmental Ethics, an 
Anthology, ed. Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston, III (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 49-50.
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Regan’s  next  claim  is  that  “[t]he  presence  of  inherent  value  in  a  natural  object  is  a 
consequence of its possessing those other properties which it happens to possess.”36 This remark is 
almost identical to the definition provided by G. E. Moore (and it so happens that Regan is a Moore  
scholar). Regan adds that such value would be a consequential or supervenient property and that 
this point follows directly from the first one.37 
Third, according to Regan, intrinsic value must be objective, as opposed to subjective.38 If a 
river,  for  example,  is  inherently  valuable,  then  “it  is  a  fact  about  the  river that  it  is  good 
inherently.”39 Regan does not say whether this point also follows from the first one. Although the 
distinction  between “objective”  and “subjective”  properties  sounds like  the  distinction  between 
properties that are mind-independent and those that are mind-dependent, this distinction might be 
false;  for  example,  it  might  be  true  objectively  that  I  am thinking  right  now,  yet  still  mind-
dependent. If indeed it is possible for a property to be mind-dependent yet objective, then a case 
might be made that values can have both features as well. One would be hard-pressed to make such 
a case, however, for there is a prima facie distinction between it being true objectively that a thing is 
valued by a conscious agent, on the one hand, and it being true objectively that a thing has value, on 
the other. In the meantime, we may still acknowledge that any property that is mind-independent is 
objective. It seems therefore that Regan’s third point also follows from his first.
Fourth, “[t]he inherent value of a natural object is such that toward it the fitting attitude is 
one of admiring respect.”40 This idea “provides a way of connecting what is inherently valuable in 
the environment with an ideal of human nature.”41 In other words, the concept of intrinsic value is 
accompanied  by  that  of  ideal  (and  un-ideal)  persons.  The  ideal  person  has  the  following 
capabilities: she can distinguish the objects in nature that are intrinsically valuable from those that 
36  Regan, “Nature and Possibility,” 31. Regan uses “inherent” in place of “intrinsic.”
37  Ibid.
38  Ibid.
39  Ibid.
40  Ibid.
41  Ibid.
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are not, and admires and respects the ones that are.42 “Admiration is fitting because not everything 
in nature is inherently valuable . . . . Respect is appropriate because this is a fitting attitude to have 
toward that which has value in its own right.”43 Furthermore, the ideal person never treats as a mere 
means those things that have intrinsic value.44 In sum, the person is ideal in both character  and 
epistemic ability: she regards things in nature with respect and admiration, but she also recognizes 
correctly which things have value and which do not,  and she recognizes  that  such value is  an 
intrinsic property.
Finally,  this  respect  and  admiration  brings  about  a  “preservation  principle.”  “By 
‘preservation principle,’” explains Regan, “I mean a principle of nondestruction, noninterference, 
and,  generally,  nonmeddling.  By  characterizing  this  in  terms  of  a  principle,  moreover,  I  am 
emphasizing that preservation . . . be regarded as a moral imperative.”45 
In summary,  Regan’s  concept  of  intrinsic  value construes  it  as  a  property that  is  mind-
independent, consequential or supervenient upon other properties of a natural object, and objective; 
it is fitting to regard objects that possess this property with admiration and respect, and the property 
gives rise to moral obligations. Keeping these things in mind, I am going to call upon the reader to 
participate for a moment in a thought-experiment: suppose that you and I have never before heard 
of  intrinsic  value.  Suppose,  furthermore,  that  the term has  just  been introduced to us,  but  that 
instead of being called “intrinsic value,” it is introduced to us under the much more mysterious 
name “Property P.” Why remove the word “value?” Because raising the question of how intrinsic 
value, if it exists, can entail any moral obligations might provoke one to respond immediately that it 
entails them simply in that “value” connotes something normative, a moral property. But now we no 
longer have the word “value” to help us, and therefore, if we are to understand how the possession 
of Property P functions as a source of moral obligation to something, we will need it explained to us 
without mere recourse to the claim that it is a kind of value. All we know about Property P thus far 
42  Ibid.
43  Ibid.
44  Ibid.
45  Ibid., 31-32.
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is that it is a property. If we add to this some of the remarks made by Regan, then we know the 
following:
(1) Property P is mind-independent.
(2) Property P supervenes upon or follows consequentially from other properties an object  
possesses.
(3) Property P is an objective property of whatever possesses it; if a thing has Property P,  
then it is a fact about that thing that it has Property P.
The problem with this account is that we do not, given the information supplied in the three 
propositions above, have a very firm or substantial concept of what Property P is like or of what 
something with Property  P would be like if  it  possessed it.  I  will  not  go so far  as to say that 
predicating Property P of something fails to offer any description at all, or that we have no concept 
whatsoever of Property P—we are told some things about it. But are we told enough for the concept 
to tell us something truly meaningful about the owner of Property P? To help answer this question, 
it  is  useful  to make a distinction between first-order and second-order  properties.  Second-order 
properties are the odder of the two: they are properties of properties, such as being extrinsic or 
intrinsic,  objective  or  subjective,  instantiated  or  uninstantiated,  natural,  non-natural,  physical, 
supervenient, and so forth. First-order properties are much simpler and better reflect what we think 
of when we think of properties: they belong to things, as opposed to properties of things, and can be 
referred to without any mention of second-order properties. As it concerns Property P, we are given 
several  second-order properties,  yet  we are not supplied any information about Property  P that 
would allow us to understand it as a first-order property. We know that if something were to possess 
Property P, it would possess a property that is mind-independent, supervenient or consequential, and 
objective. To be sure, this tells us something about an object that has Property P, but not much—not 
enough, I think, for one to offer a robust description of the owner of the property.
What, then, do we accomplish when we predicate Property P of something? Let us compare 
it to another property, for instance, greenness: certainly, we can name some of the second-order 
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properties of greenness, for instance, being extrinsic, natural, observer-dependent, or—obviously—
a color. But we can do more than this: we can also understand what it is like for something to be 
green. Perhaps we cannot describe what green looks like in words, but still, we may at least refer to 
it indexically: I can point to my lawn, say “The lawn is green,” and somehow we understand what I 
mean. On the other hand, when one says “The lawn has property  P,” something seems to fail in 
terms of adding to our conceptual content of the lawn. We are given some second-order properties, 
but there seems not to be any first-order property. One might object by saying that a statement such 
as “The grass has a mind-independent, objective, consequential property” is to name a first-order 
property—the statement clearly does describe the grass and not just a property. I agree, but not 
without  some  hesitance,  for  it  seems  quite  intuitive  that  something  vital  is  missing  from the 
description. If we can understand Property P only in terms of its second-order properties, then we 
are certainly saying something about the structure or typology of the property, but we're not saying 
anything about its content. We are describing a property, but we seem to be providing only a meager 
description of the owner of that property.
What, then, is it about Property P that makes Regan's next two claims true?
(4) Any natural object with Property P merits our “admiration and respect,” such that each  
is a “fitting attitude,” and
(5) Our admiration and respect for things with Property P give rise to a moral imperative,  
the preservation principle.
I believe there is nothing about Property P that makes these claims true; the concept is too 
flimsy for  it  to  have  any moral  effect  on  us.  My objection,  then,  is  metaphysical  rather  than 
epistemological: intrinsic value lacks causal power. Although it putatively functions as a reason for 
us to act a certain way with regard to the intrinsically valuable object, still, we must keep in mind 
that reasons have causal connections to things in the world as well. Yet the rather empty concept 
described in (1) through (3) does not provide us any force, impression, or influence of any kind, 
such that it can serve as a source of moral motivation. To predicate it of an object, even if the 
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predication were true, seems tantamount to predicating nothing. It is unsurprising, then, that value-
skepticism should be a problem for intrinsic value,  since it  seems dubious that such a vaguely 
understood property could be known; and it is unsurprising as well that the is-ought problem should 
appear, since it is difficult to understand how that property could provide a reason to act morally. In 
contrast to these objections, my objection points out only that the concept of intrinsic value seems 
incapable of having any influence upon us agents. Our deliberations, judgments, and reactions to 
things in the external world undoubtedly have causal connections to the things in that world—and 
to their various properties—in some way or another. I am dubious that intrinsic value, as it has been 
described for us by Regan, could allow any such connection. The upshot of this, then, is that if there 
is some feature or set of features in the world that serve to elicit moral reactions from us, it cannot 
include intrinsic value. It must be a property (or properties) of another kind.
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(2) Some Remarks on Noncognitivism
Now  that  we  have  rejected  intrinsic  value,  to  what  alternative  do  we  turn?  Various 
metaethical theories have been developed that attempt to explain what is involved when we call 
something “good,” “right,” (or “bad,” “wrong”) or the like. These views tend to be placed under one 
of two broad categories: “cognitivist” and “noncognitivist.”46 Cognitivists hold that moral sentences 
express propositions, i.e., sentences that can be true or false. Moral realism is one example: the 
moral realist  holds that some moral sentences describe genuine facts  about reality that are true 
irrespective of whether anyone believes them. Error theory is another type of cognitivism; the error 
theorist holds that all moral statements are false. Ethical subjectivism is also cognitivist; according 
to ethical subjectivism, moral statements are simply statements about the attitudes of the speaker, 
which themselves possess truth-value.
Noncognitivist views deny that moral sentences possess truth value, asserting instead that 
they express some kind of attitude, predilection, or interest on behalf of the speaker. The emotivism 
of A. J. Ayer is one example; Ayer asserts that ethical sentences merely voice one's approval or 
disapproval  towards  something.47 R.  M. Hare's  theory of  universal  prescriptivism holds  that  an 
ethical sentence is an imperative sentence intended to influence a listener or listeners to act a certain 
way in a certain kind of situation.48 The expressivism of Charles Stevenson combines these two 
views: according to Stevenson, to call something good means literally “I approve of this; do so as 
well.”49
Some other philosophers' views seem to resist, or, at the very least, not really concern the 
cognitivist/noncognitivist divide, and the views listed above are by no means exhaustive of those 
that fit neatly into the two categories. These views are instructive, however, in that each of them, in 
addition to having something to say regarding the metaphysics  and semantics of morality,  also 
46 "Cognitive" in this context means of or pertaining to truth or falsity and/or, with regard to sentences, capable of 
possessing truth-value. "Noncognitive" means the opposite.
47 Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952), 108.
48 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (London: Oxford UP, 1972), 1-16.
49 Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale UP, 1944), 81.
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assume what it would involve, psychologically, for an agent to regard something as good, bad, right, 
or wrong: for the cognitivist, to regard something as good is to hold a particular belief about it. For 
the emotivist, it is to take a certain emotional attitude toward it. For the prescriptivist, it is to will  
that one act a certain way with regard to it.
I am going to assume that noncognitivism is (probably) false. I am going to assume that  
moral statements—statements about qualities such as goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness
—can and do express beliefs, at least sometimes and in part.50 This seems to me intuitive; indeed, it 
seems almost impossible to disbelieve, given the way in which we employ moral vocabulary. The 
challenge  that  interests  me  at  this  moment  is  determining  how  to  explain  those  beliefs. 
Noncognitivists, emotivists in particular, seem to find themselves at odds with the idea that moral 
statements have truth-value when such statements often seem to be bound up in some way with 
affect. Thus, the emotivists assume, moral statements really just express emotions. I wish to find a 
theory that can explain the close relation between sentiment and morality without succumbing to the 
claim that there are no moral beliefs and turning ethics into some sort of anti-rational enterprise. I 
spend chapter three doing this; for the remainder of this chapter, I discuss a view that attempts to 
retain noncognitivism, specifically, an emotivist view, and still argue for the possibility of rational 
moral discourse. I try to show why it does not work, and why cognitivism is necessary in order for 
the enterprise of moral discourse to succeed.
2.i. A Critique of Projectivism
Though I reject emotivism and other noncognitivist views, it is still necessary to address the 
connection  between  moral  belief  (namely,  as  it  relates  to  our  discussion  of  belief  in  moral 
properties) and feeling.  It must be more than a coincidence that we tend to have certain feelings 
toward the things we believe are valuable, and it behooves us to attempt to explain some sort of 
causal relation between the beliefs and the feelings. Simon Blackburn has made a famous attempt to 
50 I say "in part” because there may be emotive aspects to moral statements as well, and I say “sometimes” because  
declarative sentences may not necessarily express beliefs, for example, if the speaker is lying, or in the case of  
phrases such as “There is no God,” when it is used merely to express the despondency or frustration of the speaker 
and not her theological opinions.
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do something roughly along these lines. Blackburn argues that moral properties “are projections of 
our own sentiments (emotions, reactions, attitudes, commendations)”  towards things we encounter 
in the world.51 His position is inspired by an interpretation of a certain famous remark made by 
David Hume in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Hume identifies and distinguishes 
two faculties of human beings, “reason” and “taste,” the first of which “conveys knowledge of truth 
and falsehood,” and the second of which “gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and 
virtue.”52 Of taste, Hume writes that it “has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural 
objects, with the colors, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation.” 53 It 
is this remark, in particular, that concerns Blackburn. Such sentiments differ from beliefs in that the 
latter are about the truth or falsity of things, whereas the former are not. The process described by 
Blackburn begins when “genuine, observed properties,” that is to say, morally neutral properties 
represented through sense-data, “impinge” upon the observer, bringing about certain affective or 
conative responses.  Blackburn lists  “habits, emotions,  sentiments,” and “attitudes” as examples. 
These  responses  are  then  “projected”  upon  the  observed  phenomena  as  what  Blackburn  calls 
“spread  properties,”54 in  much  the  same  way  that  sentiment,  according  to  Hume,  “gilds”  and 
“stains” the natural objects observed in the external world, resulting in a “new creation.” Humans 
then form beliefs about these spread properties, effectively regarding them as genuinely real and 
statements about them as true or false.
Blackburn supplements his projectivism thesis  with another view, which he calls “quasi-
realism.” “Quasi-realism,” writes Blackburn, “is the enterprise of explaining why our discourse has 
the shape it does, in particular by way of treating evaluative predicates like others, if projectivism is 
true.”55 If projectivism accurately describes our moral thinking, quasi-realism may be used as a tool 
51 Simon Blackburn,  Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language  (Oxford: UP, 1984), 180. J. 
Baird Callicott takes a similar view, arguing that "inherent value" (this is his use of term), though not an intrinsic  
property, is "conferred or projected" upon things by valuing agents. See Callicott,  In Defense of the Land Ethic:  
Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: SUNY UP, 1989), 161.
52 Hume, Enquiry, 88.
53 Ibid.
54 Blackburn, Spreading the Word, 181.
55 Ibid., 180.
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to explain and evaluate that thinking. In particular, quasi-realism is an attempt for us “to earn our 
right to talk of moral truth, while recognizing fully the subjective sources of our judgments, inside 
our own needs, desires, and natures.”56 An unearned notion of truth, presumably, is one that would 
fail to recognize the latter. It is Blackburn's belief that by employing quasi-realism, people will be 
able to reach reasonable conclusions about moral matters.
Does Blackburn's projectivism work as a suitable alternative Regan's intrinsic-value view? 
In at least one respect it is preferable, for unlike the view expounded by Regan, projectivism at least 
proposes a causal relation between the properties of an object and moral motivation. Regan assumes 
that moral properties are external to and independent of any observing agent, and yet there is no 
way of imagining, as far as I can tell, how those properties are in any way able to “impinge” upon 
an observer and bring about a moral response. On the other hand, Blackburn's view, like Hume's, 
attempts to locate properties that can and do share causal relations with humans, and he attempts 
furthermore to plausibly explain the relation between those properties and moral motivation. As 
Hume writes, only taste, not reason, can stir a human to action, functioning as “the first spring or 
impulse  to  desire  and  volition.”57 The  disinterested  perception  of  properties  in  the  world, 
unmediated by sentimental responses, can't.
But projectivism is not without problems. The first one, incisively noted by John McDowell, 
is what seems to be its overly simplistic metaphysics:
projectivism has nothing to sustain its thin conception of reality (that onto which the 
projections  are  effected)  but  a  contentiously  substantial  version  of  the 
correspondence  theory  of  truth,  with  the  associated  picture  of  a  genuinely  true 
judgment as something to which the judger makes no contribution at all.58
Initially, it might be tempting to think of Blackburn's view as one which portrays humans, by means 
of  their  projective  faculty,  as  active  participants  in  the  construction  of  reality.  But  on  further 
examination,  projectivism  actually  portrays  them  as  passive;  a  world  of  “genuine,  observed 
56 Ibid., 197.
57 Hume, Enquiry, 88.
58 John  McDowell,  "Values  and  Secondary  Qualities,"  in  Moral  Discourse  and  Practice:  Some  Philosophical  
Approaches, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (New York: Oxford UP, 1997), 209.
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properties,”  all  of  which  are  natural  and  value-free,  “impinges”  upon  human  perception.  The 
resultant projections, strictly speaking, do not exist in the way that the value-free properties exist, 
but are only “quasi-real” flukes of human perception which can be described as real but in fact are 
not; only the “genuine, observed” things can be correctly called real. Humans might provide further 
descriptions of reality which, according to Blackburn, it would be pragmatic to regard as true or 
real,59 but ultimately, they are not truly true, nor are they really real.
McDowell,  in  the  essay  quoted  above,  is  not  interested  in  further  discussing  the 
metaphysical problems related to truth-theories. I, however, am, assuming that part of the present 
task is to discuss the relation between properties of things and moral motivation. Like Hume and 
Blackburn  (and  countless  others),  I  am  in  certain  agreement  that  there  is  a  relation  between 
perception, affective responses, and morality; however, I reject the projectivist model. Part of this 
has to do with the reliance on a hard correspondence theory of truth that McDowell notes of it. 
Another  objection  concerns  what  I  think  is  a  failure  of  the  projectivism/quasi-realism view to 
achieve what Blackburn wants it to achieve. Blackburn's project is for quasi-realism to simulate the 
ordinary  vocabulary  of  realism,  thereby  allowing  us  to  engage  in  moral  discourse.  However, 
Blackburn is a noncognitivist when it comes to moral sentences; on his view, the latter express 
attitudes, not beliefs.60 Since moral sentences do not assert anything, it appears that they cannot 
operate within logical propositions or arguments.61 How, for example, can a conjunctive sentence 
such as “It is wrong to tell lies and your mother is going to be annoyed” be true or false, given that 
the second conjunct is a proposition while the first is only an emotive expression?62
In order to address this problem, Blackburn argues that even if one of the sentences does not 
contain an assertion, both sentences still contain commitments, and so long as the speaker accepts 
both commitments, the attitude expressed in the first conjuct and the assertion in the second, then 
59 Blackburn, Spreading the Word," 182.
60 Ibid., 170-171.
61 Ibid., 190.
62 Ibid., 191.
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this  creates  “an overall  commitment  which  is  accepted  only if  each  component  is  accepted.”63 
Blackburn then uses this solution to illustrate how sentences expressing attitudes can fit into logical 
arguments. The legitimacy of such sentences should be judged not by their truth value, but by the 
sensibility of  the  speaker,  which  is  determined  by  the  behavior  of  one's  community  and  its 
endorsement  or  approbation.  “For  instance,”  explains  Blackburn,  “a  sensibility  which  pairs an 
attitude of disapproval towards telling lies, and an attitude of calm or approval towards getting your 
little brother to tell lies, would not meet my endorsement. I can only admire people who would 
reject the second action as strongly as they reject the first.”64 The acceptability of moral sentences—
and of moral arguments incorporating those sentences—therefore depends on the consistency of the 
commitments  expressed  by  the  speaker;  consistency  is  desirable  because  it  is  sensible  and, 
therefore, socially endorsed.
My primary issue with this  argument  involves  Blackburn's  attempt to  pair  noncognitive 
attitudes with belief and logical argumentation. Blackburn's projectivism, as already noted, involves 
the claim that moral sentences are about attitudes, not beliefs; nevertheless, says Blackburn, both 
beliefs and moral attitudes involve commitments, and adherence to either depends on whether the 
speaker  accepts those  commitments.  It  is  Blackburn's  use  of  the  word  “accept”  that  I  have  a 
problem with, for I do not think that the notion of acceptance, strictly speaking, can pertain in the 
case of noncognitive attitudes, at least not in the way it pertains in the case of belief. The kind of 
commitment  yielded by an  expressive  sentence  would,  I  should  assume,  only be some sort  of 
affective tendency—a tendency to act on the relevant emotions and adopt similar attitudes when 
faced with similar situations. If we were to call this “acceptance,” it could not possibly mean the 
same kind of acceptance that pertains in the case of belief. And Blackburn certainly cannot mean 
that when one is committed to a moral attitude, then she accepts that she ought to act a certain way 
and hold congruent beliefs, since on an expressivist view, ought-sentences would be just another 
63 Ibid., 192.
64 Ibid.
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kind of expression. With this problem in mind, I believe that the projectivism/quasi-realism view 
fails to simulate the putative character of moral belief.
My second issue with Blackburn's view concerns its replacement of the rational evaluation 
of  moral  arguments  with  endorsement  of  another  person's  moral  sensibility.  Blackburn,  in  his 
explanation of sensibility, omits what I believe to be a vital part of how we critique the moral views 
of others. He explains the term as follows:
A moral sensibility, on [the projectivist] picture, is defined by a function from input 
of belief to output of attitude. Now not all such sensibilities are admirable. Some are 
coarse, insensitive, some are plain horrendous, some are conservative and inflexible, 
others fickle and unreliable; some are too quick to form strict and passionately held 
attitudes, some too sluggish to care about anything. But it is extremely important for 
us to rank sensibilities, and to endorse some and to reject others. For one of the main 
features affecting the desirability of the world we live in is the way other people 
behave, and the way other people behave is largely a function of their sensibility.65
Our endorsement of a person's sensibility relates to how human behavior is adapted to bring about a 
more desirable environment.  Sensibilities  that contribute to social  behavior  are better  endorsed, 
while anti-social or unconstructive sensibilities are better rejected. I grant that these features are 
relevant in many respects to human morality, yet I believe that, in the passage above, Blackburn 
omits something vital about how we conduct much of our moral discourse: rational evaluation of 
moral claims and arguments. With this in mind, I believe that Blackburn's portrait of how people 
engage in moral criticism is inaccurate.  It is unsurprising, however,  that this  inaccuracy should 
occur on a noncognitivist view such as Blackburn's.
In the end,  although Blackburn's  view attempts  admirably to  explain causal  the relation 
between sentiment and morality, its denial that we possess real moral beliefs makes it difficult to 
accept,  and its  attempts  to  compensate  for  these  difficulties  appear  deeply flawed.  In  the  next 
section, I wish to consider a somewhat radical proposal: that our sentimental faculties can help to 
tell us things about the world—things that can be true or false—in way analogous to perception. 
This much, I believe, is true: our emotions do contribute to the formation of genuine beliefs in the 
65 Ibid.
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truth of propositions. My goal now is to consider whether and how truth and justification might 
apply to such beliefs.
   26
(3) Sentiment As a Truth-selective Faculty
With the exception of skeptics, we tend to regard our perceptual faculties—our senses—as 
capable of discerning true facts about the world. Let us call such a faculty truth-selective: it assists 
us in forming beliefs, some of which are potentially true. Perception is not our only truth-selective  
ability; the complimentary faculty of inductive reasoning is also truth-selective; it helps us make 
judgments about what is probable or predictable with regard to our perceptions, and judgments 
about probability or predictability can be true as well. Deductive reasoning is (most would agree) 
our most reliable truth-selective faculty, as it permits us to form beliefs that, if backed by the right 
premises, cannot be false. Introspection is considered by many (though, like deduction, not all) to 
be infallible as well; unmediated reflection is all that is required of me to know something about my 
state of consciousness.
In sum, a faculty is truth-selective if it helps us form true beliefs. This does not necessitate 
that such beliefs are always justified for the believer, but only that there is a connection between the 
faculty,  the truth of  a  proposition,  and belief  in  the proposition.  Such faculties  are  not  always 
reliable, nor is any single one of them always sufficient to yield justified beliefs (or any beliefs at 
all).  Deductive reasoning, for example,  cannot by itself allow us to form justified beliefs about 
states of affairs in the external world without being assisted in some way by perception; perception 
is  often  unable  to  tell  us  what  might  happen  in  the  future  without  the  supplementary  use  of 
inductive reasoning;  and introspection about  my current  sensory experiences  does  always yield 
knowledge of the things perceived. Different faculties might need the support of others if they are to 
be employed effectively. Furthermore, truth-selective faculties may often fail; a perceiver may be 
nearsighted, one may reason invalidly, or a researcher may conduct an experiment carelessly or fail 
to make essential observations that would otherwise affect her conclusion. The debate over what 
makes  beliefs  justified  is  an  endless  and contentious  one,  but  generally,  these  four  faculties—
perception, induction, deduction, and introspection—are the ones most frequently discussed; in any 
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discussion of what is true or knowable, we instantly assume that they are relevant.66
My contention  is  that  sentiment  is  a  truth-selective  faculty.  My argument  relies  on  the 
following assumptions: (1) that sentiment causes belief, (2) that some such beliefs are true, and (3) 
that we would not be able to have any such beliefs if we did not have our sentimental faculties. 
Chapter four, however, qualifies this thesis with the following claims: sentiment is not the only 
truth-selective faculty that can contribute to moral belief; logical deduction can as well, assuming 
that the antecedent beliefs that factor into those deductions are produced by sentiment. The idea 
here is that although we have a set of core moral beliefs established in part through emotion, logical 
obligation requires that the agent hold beliefs consistent with the sentimentally produced ones, even 
if the logically derived beliefs are not formed directly from sentiment. Coherence, therefore, is a 
significant part of the test of justification in moral belief.
3.i. Sentiment and Normativity
I employ the word “sentiment” in two senses: the first concerns the emotions we experience 
towards things.  This  is  not  the same as  sentimentality,  the literary or  rhetorical  exploitation of 
people's  (typically more  vulnerable)  emotions.  A sentiment  can  involve  any emotion,  negative, 
positive, or both.67 Sentiments are also object-directed; they are the emotions we have toward, and 
not merely in response, to things in the world. A phobic response unconsciously triggered by some 
unacknowledged environmental stimulus is not a sentiment; if, on the other hand, I am made aware 
of the stimulus and find it  frightening,  I  now have a sentiment  towards the frightening object.  
Relevant examples may be invented for all the other emotions: sadness, anger, joy, and so on. We 
can have more than one kind of sentiment towards the same thing; spiders, for example, may inspire 
feelings  of  both  fascination  and  disgust.  Furthermore,  different  people  might  have  different 
66 There  are probably numerous other  truth-selective  faculties.  Memory,  for  instance,  helps  us  identify things by 
applying remembered concepts to perceived characteristics. It  might also be that the cut-off point between truth-
selective faculties and other kinds is difficult to draw. My heart needs to be beating in order for my senses to work. 
Is the ability to pump blood a truth-selective faculty? This is not a question I think isf necessary to pursue to get  
across the basic idea of what a truth-selective faculty is.
67 Awe, for example, is not merely negative or positive. It involves profound admiration as well as deep fear of the 
awesome thing.
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sentiments towards the same thing—one may not fear spiders at all, while another may.
The second sense of the term refers simply to our ability to have any such sentiments. This, I 
assume, needs little elaboration. If I feel  a sentiment of awe while looking out over the Grand 
Canyon, it is because I am able to: something in my biological and psychological makeup gives me 
the ability to have emotional responses towards the stimuli  I  encounter.  This is straightforward 
enough.
Sentiment can contribute to belief in a variety of ways. One rudimentary example is that it  
tells us how we respond emotionally to things: being fearful of spiders tells me that spiders are 
frightening to me, being in awe of the Grand Canyon tells me I find it awesome, and so on. Circular  
as this account sounds, there is an important distinction to be made: fearing or being in awe of 
something is a noncognitive attitude, while thinking that it is frightening or awesome, even if only 
to me, is a belief. Sentiment may also contribute to belief in cases of hope or denial: hoping strongly 
enough that one will recover from an illness may produce a belief that she will. Thus, noncognitive 
mental states can yield cognitive ones that have to do with truth or falsity. The same obtains with 
the relation between perceptions, for example, colors or sounds, and beliefs about our environment; 
colors and sounds are not cognitive, but the beliefs they contribute to are. It is established, then, that 
noncognitive mental states can yield cognitive ones.
This, I am sure, is nothing new to the reader. But sentiment can also help me form normative  
beliefs; it can help me determine the way in which it makes sense to regard or treat things. That is to 
say, there is a connection between the sentiments I have for a thing and rational motivation. My 
view, then, is notably different from Hume's. Hume believes that a motive to act follows directly 
from sentiment without any prior belief in rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness. I argue that 
such a belief must prevail in order for the motivation to occur. The assumption that all so-called 
“moral” behavior really involves only the indulgence of one's emotions due to some hedonistic 
drive is inaccurate. Sentiment helps us learn  how to act; it does not merely (or even necessarily) 
make us act.
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Normative beliefs fall into one of two categories: evaluations and directives. Evaluations, in 
particular, are what I have in mind when I say that sentiment contributes to normative beliefs: they 
are beliefs about whether something is good or bad.68 Directives, on the other hand, are beliefs 
about what one ought  or ought not to  do.  I  wish to  argue for a tight motivational relationship 
between the two: on my view, evaluations in everyday life involve making determinations about 
whether  something  is  worthy  of  a  directive,  not  about  metaphysical  properties.  Claims  about 
whether something is  good or bad are therefore action-guiding; while directives concern which 
actions one ought to take, evaluations are determinations of where we should focus those actions—
they are beliefs about which things are worth our attention and effort.  Directives, on my view, 
function as hypothetical imperatives; once we have made our evaluations, directives tell us what 
actions we ought to take in order to treat the worthwhile object as though it were worthwhile, taking 
into account considerations of what is good for it. For example, if I make the evaluation that a plant 
is good, and I then determine that the plant's promotion and integrity depend upon its growth and 
flourishing, the resultant directive is that I ought to let it grow and flourish. Let us take another 
example: if I make a positive evaluation about you, and believe that you benefit from liberty, then 
the resultant directive is that I ought to respect your liberty. A desire to promote the end in question 
prevails at some point in this scheme.
In this  regard,  I  side with Philipa Foot in  believing that there is  no distinction between 
categorical  and  hypothetical  imperatives.69 Moral  motivation  might  be  in  some  respects 
phenomenologically  different from generic prudence, or perhaps it is to be found in the distinction 
between altruistic and non-altruistic behavior. I do not claim to have a definitive answer to what 
distinguishes the two. Nevertheless, I argue that regardless of the possible distinctions, both possess 
the same fundamental connections of feelings, beliefs, desires, intentions, and actions. What I hope 
will be one of the side-effects of this discussion is to refute the idea that sentiment in ethics commits 
68 They can also include beliefs about a thing's aesthetic qualities.
69 Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972): 305-
316.
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us to some sort of psychological egoism, in which an agent's feelings are the only end she really 
cares about. Within the scheme that I argue for, an agent's conduct can have its origins in sentiment 
and yet still be completely altruistic, i.e., still be such that the agent's own good does not factor into  
her reasons for acting.70 I must also emphasize crucially that a belief about my own sentiment is not  
what provides the reason for action. Believing the statement “I like people” is not what motivates 
one to act beneficently. The relevant reason is the belief that something is worth my attention and 
effort. It is in this respect that I believe sentiment is truth-selective; it can give me some information 
about what it's reasonable for me to do as an agent—objectively reasonable, in that it is a true fact 
that it is reasonable for me to believe in the worthiness of something and act accordingly (and, if 
you share my reasons,  objectively reasonable  for  you as  well).  Most  of  us  are  uninterested  in 
questions about the metaphysics of values; we are more interested in determining what it makes 
sense to care about.71 Here, I think, is where we can reach true answers about what we ought to do. 
After all, when I assent to a claim about what it is most reasonable or rational72 for me to to believe 
or to do, in the end, I seem to find myself confronted by a statement about what I ought to believe 
or to do. Rationality implies normativity.
3.ii. Sentiment, Moral Belief, and Moral Motivation
It is difficult to explain precisely how sentiments give rise to evaluative beliefs, just as it is 
difficult  to  explain  precisely  why  perceptions  bring  about  descriptive  beliefs.  Why does  the 
perception of a bright green circle bring about my belief that a tennis ball is on the floor? One way 
to begin answering this question is to bring up the notion of concepts. I have a concept of a tennis 
ball that involves certain perceptible properties such as bright greenness and circularity, and the 
70 In this respect, my view is similar to the one proposed by Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism. Nagel's main 
argument is that beliefs are what motivate altruistic behavior, not sentiments like sympathy—"it is not a feeling."  
My scheme, however, attempts to locate a place for sentiment. Nagel also wants to minimize the role played by 
desire in moral motivation, arguing that desires are merely an obvious and trivially true consequence of altruistic  
behavior. See Thomas Nagel, "From the Possibility of Altruism," in  Moral Discourse and Practice,  ed. Stephen 
Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (New York: Oxford UP, 1997), 323. I on the other hand argue that both 
the belief and the desire are necessary to account for, and I argue furthermore that the belief motivates the desire.
71 “Care” in this context should not be taken to mean  “caring” in the sense of tender devotion to something, but only 
in the sense of taking an interest in something—the sense that one employs in the phrase “I don't care.” One may 
certainly care about a thing in both senses, however.
72 Here I am using the terms "reasonable" and "rational" synonymously.
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thing I see on the floor seems to meet the criteria of that concept. We might call the process by 
which I apply these concepts conditioning. By conditioning, I do not mean to say that I am the one 
conditioned to have these concepts, but rather, that my concepts establish conditions by which I 
classify and give names to the things I encounter in the world. As a result, conditions determine the 
meanings  of the sentences in which those names are employed,  which then allow us to devise 
propositions  that  may be true or false.  A tennis  ball  is  identified as such because it  meets the 
relevant conditions that my conceptual faculties have established for it. Those conditions include 
certain perceptual experiences—“raw feels,” we might call them—such as a bright green circle. 
Although those perceptual experiences are themselves not beliefs, when combined and arranged in 
the right way so as to fit the right concepts, they then yield a believed proposition, specifically, the 
proposition “A tennis ball is on the floor.” If the proposition is true, then there is a causal connection 
between the tennis ball and the true belief I have about it. Perception thereby functions as a truth-
selective faculty; it allows me to obtain the information necessary for forming true beliefs.
Sentiment and perception are not the same, however. Perception, we assume, provides us 
with a causal connection to things that are “outside” of ourselves and therefore objectively real in 
some significant way. Sentiment, we assume, does not involve any such causal relationship, and 
whatever  beliefs  it  may yield  about  things  in  the  external  world  therefore  lack  the  connection 
assumed to obtain in the case of perception. It is therefore dubious that sentiment could connect us 
with the truth of anything in that external world.
With the latter claim I am in full agreement. Sentiment cannot assume the role of perception. 
This is true in cases of hope and denial; for example, I might hope so earnestly that a sick family 
member will recover that I come to believe she will. However, even if she does, my hopefulness has 
no connection with the fact that she is going to recover; if any truth-selective faculty did, it would 
be a combination of perception and inductive reasoning. Another example is a man so terrified of 
the idea of his wife cheating on him that he comes to believe adamantly that she isn't. Indeed, she 
might very well not be, but the husband's sentiment would have no causal connection between his  
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belief that she is not cheating on him and the fact that she is not. Perception, on the other hand, 
could have such a connection—for example, the husband could hire a spy to observe his wife for a 
prolonged  period  of  time  and  affirm that  she  is  indeed  not  cheating  on  him.  Unquestionably, 
sentiment cannot do what perception does, nor is it my argument that it can.
My argument,  rather,  is  that  sentiment  can tell  us  which things are  worth caring about. 
Hume's picture of moral psychology is that sentiments lead directly to moral motivation (they are 
“the first spring or impulse to desire and volition”), while beliefs do not. The sequence of events, 
for Hume, is sentiment → desire → intention → action. I wish to challenge this scheme and argue 
that a belief falls between the sentiment and the desire. The belief is about a relationship between 
me and the object: it is the belief that something is worth my moral attention and effort.  This is  
valuation—not the sentiment I feel for something, but the belief that it qualifies for my directives. If 
this is the case, then moral motivation is supported by beliefs, contra Hume, who claims that it is 
merely spurred or compelled by sentiment. My view, on the other hand, is that the sentiments bring 
about the beliefs, while the beliefs bring about the motivation to act. These beliefs also add to our 
concepts of things, conditioning the way in which we conceive of them: we find them valuable, in 
that  we regard them as providing some reason to hold certain desires,  form intentions that  are 
appropriate to those desires, and act accordingly.
What evidence do I possess to dispute Hume's conception of moral psychology? The first is 
that a belief is a necessary condition of having an intention. When people act intentionally, they do 
so for reasons. Why should matters be any different in the case of moral motivation? Hume wrote  
with regard to belief that it can only function in terms of deciding how an action should be carried 
out  after a sentiment has motivated one to act.73 Unfortunately, he neglected to explain how an 
intention can exist without a belief that the action is preferable to begin with, unless he meant to 
imply  that  moral  behavior  is  unintentional—which  I  would  reject  outright.  Moral  actions  are 
intentional, and I contend that without an antecedent belief, the agent would have no motive to act; 
73 Hume, Enquiry, 88.
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the agent must have a reason for acting in order to have any such motive to begin with.
A more contentious point, however, is my choice to place the belief before rather than after  
the desire to act. One may argue, first, that the desire to act is what produces the belief that  x is 
worth  the  directive;  and  second,  that  sentiments  lead  directly  to  those  desires,  e.g.,  that  the 
sentiment of sympathy leads directly to the desire to alleviate someone's bad situation.74 I maintain 
the reverse: that the sentiment brings about the belief and, furthermore, that the belief is what leads 
to the desire to act. My rationale is that a desire to act morally towards something can persist in the 
absence of any particular sentiment. Sentiment might have manifested itself quite strongly with the 
desire  at  some point  in  the  agent's  past.  Nevertheless,  it  appears  that  one  may possess  moral 
motivation even in the absence of that sentiment, for example, when relatively cool-headed or even 
when experiencing negative feelings (frustration, for example) towards the moral beneficiary. If an 
agent can possess a desire to act morally even when not experiencing the relevant sentiment, then 
there must be something else motivating that desire. What would that be?
I think the most plausible answer to that question is a belief. Agents carry with them a set of  
beliefs about what things are worth their moral attention. A belief of this kind is initially formed 
from a sentiment that the agent has towards an object, but the sentiment need not persist for the 
belief to remain, nor need it persist in order to sustain the agent's desire to act positively towards 
(e.g.,  to  benefit,  promote,  preserve,  defend,  or  in  some way further)  the object  if  the situation 
demands. A belief is what sustains that desire. Indeed, it might even be possible for an agent's 
sentimental inclinations to change over time while her moral beliefs remain the same. For example, 
she might come to terribly fear dogs due to some traumatic event, yet still consider them worthy of 
her moral consideration in spite of her terror of them.
How, then, do I support the argument that sentiment leads to evaluative beliefs? The best 
explanation I can come up with (I think it is a good one, if not an incomplete one) is by working 
74 Note, however, that even if this were true, it need not threaten my claim that sentiments are truth-selective, so long  
as it were also the case that those desires could yield true beliefs.
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backwards. If certain sentiments are often paired with certain desires, and if those desires must be 
sustained by evaluative beliefs, then the sentiments must yield the evaluations if the desires are to  
persist. How could it be otherwise, unless one were to argue for the implausible claim that desires 
somehow retroactively generate evaluations, or that the correlation between sentiment and moral 
belief  is just a fortuitous happenstance? Further insight into this process is a task for empirical 
psychology, though I believe my theory of moral motivation, rudimentary as it is, is more accurate 
than Hume's. Sentiments don't just compel me to act morally in the same way that thirst compels me 
to reach for a glass of water, especially not given how moral motivation persists throughout one's 
lifetime and affects one's considered plans for the future. Belief in the worth of things must play a 
role in such considerations.
With regard to  the connection between sentiment  and the truth of evaluations,  we stand 
confronted with a sort of anomaly. I have argued that an evaluation is a belief about what it is  
reasonable to care about,75 and consequently, about what it is reasonable to do—and ought to desire 
and intend to  do.  I  have  argued furthermore  that  such  beliefs  must  precede  those  desires  and 
intentions.  I  have  also  speculated—reasonably,  I  think—that  there  is  probably  some  causal 
connection  between  sentiments  and  moral  motivation.76 However,  I  have  also  argued  that  if 
evaluation precedes motivation, then the sentiment must be what brings about that evaluation. So, if 
I am correct in claiming that some such evaluations are true, then there is likely some connection 
between sentiment and truth. Either that, or the correlation between sentiment and moral belief is an 
uncanny coincidence, which I find dubious.
Precisely how that connection functions is a mystery, though I think the matter can be made 
a bit less mysterious by acknowledging that the connection between sentiments and evaluations is 
75 Some may find this point trivially true. I do not. “Yes,” one might say, “claims about value and moral-standing are  
claims about what we ought to care about. We know this already. What about the metaphysics of such value?” I am 
attempting to reframe the issue by giving a commonsense definition of value. In everyday parlance, what we mean  
when we call things valuable or worthy for their own sake is just that we ought to care about them. Metaphysical  
concerns, I think, obfuscate this point. I do, however, think values do have a certain metaphysical character, which I  
address in chapter five.
76 Entailing, literally, that my argument that sentiment is truth-selective is, in fact, a hypothesis, since it relies on a  
premise supported by inductive reasoning.
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not in every respect analogous to that of perceptions and objects. Whereas perception, to put it in 
crude terms, tells me about things “outside” myself, sentiment tells me about something internal: it 
tells me about the way in which it makes sense to care about things. Perhaps a good way of looking 
at this is to understand that sentiment is action-guiding much in the same way that beliefs such as 
evaluations and directives are: sentiment is a facilitator of normativity;  it  helps us along in our 
normative lives, though, like all of our faculties, not infallibly.
3.iii.  A Fuller Scheme of Moral Motivation
In this chapter, I have tried to explain how elements such as sentiments, beliefs, desires, 
directives, and intentions factor into moral motivation. I want now to produce a more developed 
picture of how such elements work. Moral motivation takes place on two levels, a general level and 
a situational level. The general level involves how we come to value things and subsequently form 
general intentions to treat them a certain way. The situational level involves moral motivation as it  
occurs in particular situations or in reaction to certain events, and, ideally, culminates in morally 
motivated actions. The elements and structure of each level are presented in the following diagram, 
which is then explained:*
1. General:
perception of nonmoral properties → sentiment → evaluation → dispositional desire → dispositional  
intention
2. Situational:
moral perception →→ dispositional intention → directive → occurrent desire → occurrent intention: 
action
or
moral perception →→ dispositional intention → directive → occurrent desire → occurrent intention: 
no action (agent was prevented)
or
moral  perception  →→  dispositional  intention  →  directive  →  occurrent  desire  →  no  occurrent 
intention: no action (agent was irresponsible)
* A single arrow describes a relationship in which each item is the outcome of the previous one. The double arrows  
that appear on the situation level describe a relationship in which an agent refers to or retrieves something.
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General –  The agent first perceives certain properties of an object that could be called morally 
neutral or nonmoral. In most cases, these are features that are perceived by the agent's senses. The 
agent then has a sentimental reaction towards the thing perceived, such as a feeling of approbation, 
approval, or admiration. The sentimental reaction yields a certain kind of belief, an evaluation, that 
the object is good or worthwhile. Conversely, the agent may feel a negative sentiment, such as 
disapprobation or disapproval, and come to believe that the thing perceived is bad or of disvalue. 
The agent then desires that the thing be regarded or treated a certain way, for example, preserved, 
protected, benefited, and so on (or ended, prevented, or harmed, in the case of bad things). This 
desire becomes a dispositional mental state that remains with the agent in the future. The agent also 
forms an intention to generally preserve, protect, or benefit the thing in question. The intention, 
likewise, is filed away among the agent's dispositional mental states.
Situational – Moral motivation on the situational level begins when the agent has what is called a 
moral perception. Lawrence Blum describes moral perception as the ability of an agent to recognize 
whether a perceived situation is morally relevant, an ability which varies by degree among different 
people.77 For example, imagine that John and Joan are riding on a subway train. There is a woman 
on the subway who cannot find a seat and is overburdened by heavy bags of groceries. John is 
aware of the woman, but overlooks the fact that her well-being is at stake. Joan, on the other hand, 
notices that the woman is uncomfortable and that she is not faring well. In this scenario, Joan is  
demonstrating moral perception, while John is not.78 Some people are better than others at moral 
perception—we might call these people sensitive. It is not necessarily the case that those with less 
developed faculties of moral perception are insensitive or callous, but only that they are not as 
discerning as those whose faculties of moral perception are better.79
Once the agent  has  perceived the  moral  relevance of  a  situation,  she  then  retrieves  her 
dispositional intention to better, further, or protect those things she regards as valuable. Determining 
77 Lawrence Blum, "Moral Perception and Particularity," Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991): 701.
78 Ibid., 702-703.
79 Incidentally, it is possibly the case that moral perception is another kind of truth-selective faculty.
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what the particular situation calls for, the agent then comes up with a hypothetical imperative, a 
directive, to resolve whatever issue led to her moral perception. For example, the agent might notice 
that a person is crying, decide that the person needs to be comforted, and resolve that something 
ought to be done about  it.  This then yields  an  occurrent  desire on the part  of the agent  to  do 
something about the other person's distress. Unlike a dispositional desire, an occurrent desire is 
contextual,  local  to  a  specific  situation,  and  manifests  itself  within  the  agent's  state  of 
consciousness.
The situation can then culminate in one of three ways, depending on the agent and on other, 
external circumstances. First, the agent might form an intention to help the crying person and then 
act upon that intention, asking the person if she is all right and if there is anything  that can be done 
for her. Conversely, the agent might form the intention yet not act on it due to being prevented; for 
instance, the crying person might walk briskly away and enter her dorm. Or, in other cases, the 
agent might desire to assist the person, but have no intention to do so, in which case, the agent is  
irresponsible.
The picture of moral motivation that I have sketched is an attempt to put the components 
discussed throughout this chapter into perspective, explaining how perceptions yield evaluations, 
how a general intention to act morally comes about, and how these intentions are called upon in 
morally relevant situations, resulting, if circumstances are ideal, in morally motivated actions. I now 
turn to a particular component of this scheme, evaluations, and address the issue of whether and 
how they can be known.
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(4) The Truth and Justification of Values
I would like to begin this section by making a few more remarks on moral psychology, 
remarks  which  lead  directly  into  a  discussion  of  moral  epistemology.  I  conceive  of  moral 
motivation as having the same structure as prudential motivation. That there is a difference between 
the two seems intuitive, even if it might be difficult to describe or precisely pinpoint that difference. 
The difference might be that moral motivation does not have the same phenomenology as prudential 
motivation—the experiences involved in the one often feel qualitatively different from the other—
and this might be an indication that there is some distinction between the two. Still, whatever their 
differences, moral and prudential motivation are both alike in that they involve a relation between 
reasons and actions. On my view, if an agent  ought rationally  to do something, it is because she 
possesses and is cognizant of reasons to do it. Call this view rational internalism: it is the view that 
what it is rational for an agent to desire, intend, and do depends on her beliefs. The opposite view 
could be called rational externalism, on which those reasons exist, but are not necessarily possessed 
by the agent.80 On an internalist view, if Jones believes that setting himself on fire will cure his cold 
(and does not believe it will kill or maim him, and so on) then for Jones, it is rational to set himself  
on fire. On an externalist view, setting himself on fire is not rational, even if Jones does not realize 
it.  The  essential  difference  between  the  two views  is  that  according to  internalism,  an  agent's 
rational obligations are determined by her beliefs, while according to externalism, those obligations 
are determined by propositions that may or may not belong to the agent's set of beliefs.
Even though it is not in Jones' best interest to set himself on fire, it does not follow from this  
that he has no reason to—he does have a reason to set himself on fire; it just happens to be a false 
belief. Setting oneself on fire does not cure colds, but Jones is ignorant of this. Nevertheless, given 
80 Bernard Williams is regarded as the philosopher who popularized the terms “internalism” and “externalism” among 
the literature in practical  reasoning. My use of  the terms here differs  slightly from his:  according to Williams, 
internalism is the view that claims about what a person has a reason to do imply that the person is motivated to act  
thusly.  Externalism is any view that denies this condition. See Bernard Williams,  Moral Luck (Cambridge: UP, 
1981), 101.  On the other hand, my view, rational internalism, is about what it is rational for a person to do, and does  
not specify that a all person's motivations, but only her beliefs, are what dictate her rational obligations. Rational 
externalism, which I reject, is the view that those reasons need not be believed.
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that Jones thinks fire would cure his cold, it would be irrational of him to try another remedy if he  
saw no reason to. Jones' epistemic problem in this case is not that his motives are irrational; the  
problem, rather, is that his motive is backed by a false belief: fire cures colds.
Let  us  take  another  example.  Suppose  that  George  wants  to  make  money,  and  George 
believes that cutting down redwood trees will make him a lot of money.81 Unlike Jones', George's 
belief  may well  be right:  cutting down redwood trees might indeed have all  sorts  of monetary 
benefits. George therefore has a reason to cut down redwood trees, and it is rational for him to do 
so. Suppose, on the other hand, that Jane wants to preserve redwood trees, and Jane believes that 
making  it  illegal  to  cut  down  redwood  trees  will  preserve  them.82 Jane  now  has  a  reason  to 
campaign for the protection of redwood trees, and it is rational for her to do so. From all of this, 
there follows a conjunction that it is rational for George to cut down redwood trees and that it is  
rational for Jane to campaign for redwood trees.  On the rational-internalist view, this statement 
involves no contradiction. Jane can even agree that it is rational for George to cut down redwoods, 
and George can agree that it is rational for Jane to protect redwoods, and neither of them would be 
lying or speaking hypocritically. Jane and George both believe different directives, and by no means 
does  this  violate  the  principle  of  contradiction.  Where  George  and  Jane  differ  is  on  their 
evaluations.  Jane  regards  redwoods  as  worth  preserving,  while  George  does  not.  If  Jane  can 
convince George that  redwoods are worth preserving, then for George,  cutting down redwoods 
would no longer seem rational in light of his new belief. If George can get Jane to realize that they 
are not worth preserving, it would not be rational of her to try to save them, and, seeing no reason to 
continue, she would stop trying. The point of this thought-experiment is to demonstrate that people 
can disagree morally yet still be rational in holding their respective views.
Moral disagreements like the kind between George and Jane should not—and cannot—be 
resolved by comparing directives (ought statements), supposing that what one ought to do is really 
81 And also believes that deforestation of redwoods is preferable to other ways of making money, such as internet 
poker.
82 And also believes that leglislation is preferable to other means of protecting redwoods, such as planting spikes in 
them, chaining herself to them, assassinating George, and so forth.
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just the upshot—the intuitive consequence—of what it is most reasonable to do. This is because 
George and Jane disagree on certain evaluative statements about redwoods, and it is logical that 
their different evaluations should lead them to adopt different directives. Though directives can be 
constructively disputed between agents who do share the same values  with regard to a  certain 
matter, such is not the case for George and Jane. Furthermore, George and Jane  certainly cannot 
resolve their dispute by resorting to the claim that others person's directive is irrational. People can 
disagree morally and yet nevertheless be perfectly rational83 in holding their respective views. If this 
point is obvious to the reader, it nevertheless seems neglected in much of our day-to-day moral 
discourse. Who can deny having walked away from a moral debate thinking to oneself that the other 
person was irrational? Perhaps this is sometimes the case, but it often isn't. If we are to engage in 
more fruitful moral discussion, then this must be acknowledged.
The dispute between George and Jane concerns evaluations, not directives. The question at 
issue is not “Ought we or ought we not to cut down redwoods?” The question, rather, is “In what 
sort of way should redwoods matter to us?” George thinks they matter merely instrumentally, while 
Jane thinks they matter as ends-in-themselves. If we wish to determine whose belief is right (an 
ambitious goal) then we must address (1) the conditions on which beliefs of this kind are true and 
(2) the conditions on which believing those kinds of statements is justified.
When are we justified in making claims about a thing's value? My answer to this question 
begins with the rejection of two assumptions which I believe are implicit in Regan's intrinsic-value 
view. The first is what appears to be a kind of epistemological foundationalism. Though Regan's 
view does not involve the claim, typical among contemporary foundationalists, that certain beliefs 
are basic or self-justifying, it does resemble foundationalism in that it requires a starting point for 
moral  knowledge,  specifically,  knowledge  that  there  are  certain  specific  features  in  the  world, 
intrinsic values, that are there independently of human awareness. The second assumption I reject is 
its apparent reliance on a correspondence theory of truth, in that the truth-conditions of values are 
83 Or at least imperfectly rational, assuming—and I do—that justification for one's beliefs can vary by degree.
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the existence of objective, inherent properties that belong to those objects independently of human 
awareness. Thus, Regan would have it that in order to possess any justified moral beliefs, we must 
first possess beliefs that correspond to states-of-affairs in the world,  states-of-affairs that would 
obtain even if no person existed to acknowledge them. That this should be the way in which we 
learn how we should behave—how we should conduct ourselves, what we ought and ought not to 
do, how we should act rightly, in sum, how we are to live morally—this, I think, is an unappealing  
starting point, both philosophically and practically.
I argue instead that the best way to determine the truth of an evaluation is by reference to the 
truth of other propositions, and that an agent's current set of values needs to set the standard by 
which claims about the value of something are to be judged (including those claims which belong to 
the current set). My theory of value is not “property-oriented,” so to speak, in the way Regan's is—
that is to say,  it  does not attempt to explain value primarily in terms of a property that a thing 
possesses. Rather, it is motive-oriented: if something is morally worthy, it is worthy of an agent's  
moral  attention—it  is  worth  caring  about  and  ought  to  motivate  her  desires  and  actions. 
Propositions  of  this  kind,  then,  not  propositions  about  what  things  possess  what  metaphysical 
properties, are the ones whose truth-conditions we will try to determine.84
4.i. Coherentism in Truth and Knowledge
Propositions  require  support.  Coherentism,  broadly  construed,  is  the  idea  that  a  set  of 
propositions can provide such support for each other  mutually.   The term is  employed in both 
epistemology and truth-theory.85 In epistemology, a coherence theory of knowledge is one whose 
proponents argue that justification can be achieved by having a set of mutually supportive beliefs. 
Justification, on the coherentist's view, is holistic and recursive. The metaphor of a web or tapestry 
is often evoked to portray this idea: if the threads are numerous enough and arranged in the right 
way,  the  structure  stays  together.  Removing  them or  rearranging  their  connections  causes  the 
84 I said truth-conditions, not truth! It is far beyond the scope of this project to argue for which objects have moral  
standing. I have my own opinions, of course.
85 My own term for the branch of philosophy (and the various views associated with it) that deals with the nature of 
truth.
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structure to come apart. The coherentist looks for the best way to gather and arrange them, trying to 
acquire a robust number of beliefs that are logically compatible, while eliminating those that are 
contradictory. In this respect, a coherentist generally thinks of justification as something that varies 
by degree: the larger and more compatible a set of beliefs is, the more justified it can be (though  
numerous  coherentists  maintain  that  compatibility  is  not  all  that  matters).  Certain  beliefs  may 
therefore  be  reasonable,  even  if  their  justification  is  imperfect,  and  beliefs  may be  subject  to 
continuing scrutiny and evaluation. Finally, coherentists often believe that their views reflect the 
structure of human belief: a person's number of beliefs is taken to be finite, and her inferential  
processes are themselves recursive. Though there are many different versions of coherentism, all of 
them tend generally to have these characteristics.
Objections to such theories understandably follow. One is that there may be different sets of 
beliefs that are coherent, yet mutually incompatible.86 One person may believe P, another, -P. If both 
beliefs  belong  to  a  coherent  set,  then,  the  objection  goes,  both  would  count  as  instances  of 
knowledge, yet such a claim would violate the principle of contradiction. A second objection is that  
if  beliefs are to be justified only on the basis  of other beliefs,  then coherentism allows for no 
connection to the real world. Thus, justification depends only on facts about the believer, not on the 
things which the beliefs are about. This either commits the coherentist to relativism or renders her 
view (ironically) incoherent.87 Another, similar objection, noted by Laurence Bonjour, is that an 
acceptable epistemology must be “truth-conducive,” i.e., “that one who seeks justified beliefs is at 
least as likely to find true ones,” but that a coherence theory of knowledge “can do this only by 
adopting a coherence theory of truth and the absurd idealistic metaphysics which goes along with 
it.”88 Other objections exist, but these three are the most common.
86 Lawrence Bonjour, "The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge," in Contemporary Readings in Epistemology, 
ed. Michael F. Goodman and Robert Alan Snyder (Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 75. Bonjour himself is a 
defender of coherentism, but he notes this and other objections. Though Bonjour considers these objections only 
with respect to a coherence theory of  empirical knowledge, they seem no less applicable to a theory of moral 
knowledge, and hence, I bring them up as well.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.  Bonjour would think me absurd,  then,  as  I  do adopt  a  coherence theory of  truth,  though not necessarily 
idealism.
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The second use of the term “coherentism” describes certain theories of truth. In a manner 
similar to how a coherence theory of knowledge construes justification, a coherence theory of truth 
maintains that the truth of a proposition depends upon the truth of other propositions. Many do not 
accept  that  a  coherence  theory  of  knowledge  requires  a  coherence  theory  of  truth.  Indeed,  as 
Bonjour's remark might indicate, coherence theories of truth are somewhat unfashionable; they are 
often associated with the logical positivists of the early twentieth century, such as Rudolph Carnap, 
Otto Neurath,  and Carl  Hempel,  who were dissatisfied with the correspondence theory of truth 
maintained  trenchantly  by  Ludwig  Wittgenstein.  For  the  logical  positivists,  the  project  of  a 
coherence theory of truth was to denounce metaphysics as a pseudo-problem and conceive of truth 
merely in  terms of properties belonging to statements.  Summarizing his contemporaries'  views, 
Hempel makes a distinction between a “formal mode of speech” and a “material mode of speech.” 
In the formal mode of speech, statements, when uttered, assert “certain properties and relations of 
scientific propositions only” within a given logical system (specifically,  the “Logic of Science” 
devised by Carnap, which I will not dare attempt to summarize).89 The material mode of speech, on 
the other hand, is what a speaker uses when she talks about the world as though it were real.90 On 
the logical positivist's view, the material mode of speech tends to lead to a sort of reification fallacy, 
where the thing fallaciously assumed is a genuinely real word existing independently of the speaker:
indeed, the phrase that testing a statement is comparing it with facts, will very easily 
evoke the imagination of one definite world with certain definite properties, and so 
one will easily be seduced to ask for the one system of statements which gives a 
complete and true description of this world, and which would have to be designated 
absolutely true.91
Hempel  and  his  colleagues  deny  the  necessity  of  discussing  such  a  hypothetical  world,  and 
therefore reject the pursuit of a theory of truth that would assume its existence to be a condition of  
true statements. The idea, basically, is that one cannot get beyond or outside one's beliefs, so talk of 
a real world is meaningless and unconstructive. The logical positivists are not skeptics, as they are 
89 Carl Hempel, "On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth," Analysis 2, no. 4 (1935): 54.
90 Ibid., 55.
91 Ibid.
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uninterested in what the skeptic thinks impossible.
Richard  Rorty  has  made  similar  remarks.  He  rejects  the  possibility  that  there  can  be 
“privileged representations, ones which are automatically and intrinsically accurate.”92  He argues 
rather that “nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and that 
there is  no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test  other than 
coherence.”93 Some might find this sort  of anti-realism bleak,  and a coherence theory therefore 
unappealing, assuming that coherence and nothing more is all there is to truth.
On the other hand, Donald Davidson, in a famous paper called “A Coherence Theory of 
Truth and Knowledge,” defends a more idiosyncratic coherence theory of truth, one that goes hand-
in-hand with a coherence theory of knowledge and which tries to rescue the idea of a real world 
from destructive theories  like  those  of  Rorty and the  logical  positivists.  Davidson's  weapon of 
choice  is  language.  “Setting  aside  aberrant  cases,”  writes  Davidson,  “what  brings  truth  and 
knowledge together  is  meaning.”94 Davidson notes that  meanings,  like sentential  propositions,95 
have “objective truth-conditions” and therefore demand a theory of truth. Like Rorty and the logical 
positivists, Davidson agrees that there can be no “confrontation” between one's beliefs and reality
—“the idea of such a confrontation is absurd.”96 Nevertheless, maintains Davidson, “if coherence is 
a test of truth, then coherence is a test for judging that objective truth conditions are satisfied, and 
we  no  longer  need  to  explain  meaning  on  the  basis  of  possible  confrontation.  My slogan  is: 
correspondence without confrontation.”97
Davidson's view is particularly interesting. To begin with, we must note that he makes a 
distinction between truth-conditions and the definition of truth. Although coherence in one's beliefs, 
according to Davidson, is a truth-condition, truth itself
92 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: UP, 1979), 170.
93 Ibid., 178.
94 Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowldge," in  Epistemology: An Anthology,  2nd ed., ed. 
Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, and Matthew McGrath (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 124.
95 And presumably including them, since sentences have meanings, and since, as was noted by Davidson's mentor, W.  
V. O. Quine, names can be recast as sentences—to call something "milk," for example, is no different from saying  
"it's milk" See W. V. O. Quine, Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1981), 3.
96 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory," 124.
97 Ibid.
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is beautifully transparent compared to belief and coherence, and I take it as primitive. 
Truth,  as  applied  to  the  utterance  of  sentences,  shows  the  disquotational  feature 
enshrined in Tarski's Convention T98 . . . . What Convention T, and the trite sentences 
it declares true, like “'Grass is green' spoken by an English speaker, is true if and 
only if grass is green,” reveal is that the truth of an utterance depends on just two 
things: what the words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged.99
For Davidson, the very idea of truth—indeed, the very idea of a truth-condition—implies a real 
world, yet Davidson argues that one can get at the truth of things without having to apprehend that 
world. This is counterintuitive, yet if it were possible, it would be highly appealing. To support his 
argument, Davidson introduces his theory of “radical interpretation.” On this view, when one person 
speaks to another, the meaning of her sentence must be determined by the listener; furthermore, 
belief depends upon the meanings of the words in the sentence one believes.100 “As a matter of 
principle,  then,  meaning,  and by its  connection  with meaning,  beliefs  also,  are  open to  public 
determination. . . . What a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker means is all 
there is  to learn;  the same goes for what the speaker believes.”101 Davidson's  theory of radical 
interpretation therefore requires what he calls a “principle of charity.”102 As he writes, “the principle 
directs the interpreter to translate or interpret so as to read some of his own standards of truth into  
the patterns of sentences held true by the speaker.” The principle is employed by the listener, and its  
purpose  “is  to  make  the  speaker  intelligible,  since  too  great  deviations  from consistency  and 
correctness leave no common ground on which to judge either conformity or difference.”103 The 
principle is essentially required if the listener is to assume that the speaker believes what she is 
saying. The meaning of a sentence is therefore determined, in part, by interpretation. The other part 
is the way things are in the real world.
Davidson  argues  furthermore  that  the  evidential  relationship  typically  assumed  to  exist 
98 Alfred Tarski is famous for developing the "semantical conception of truth," which is embodied in the following 
example: "'Snow is white'" is true if, and only if, snow is white," or, even more basically, "P" is true if and only if P. 
See Alfred Tarski,  "A Semantical  Conception of Truth,"  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research  4 (1944): 
http://www.ditext.com/tarski/tarski.html.
99 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory," 125.
100Ibid.
101Ibid.
102Ibid., 130.
103Ibid.
   46
between speakers and the world should be abandoned, suggesting instead that the only relationship 
we can assume is a causal one..104 Furthermore, meaning and belief can only be understood in terms 
of a speaker's assent to a sentence, which, in turn, can only be understood in terms of the relation  
between the speaker's assent and the causes of that assent.105 If we lack this conception of how a 
speaker assents to a sentence—Davidson calls it “prompted assent”—then we have no conception 
of meaning and, therefore, no conception of belief.106 Yet we do have such a conception:
anyone with thoughts, and so in particular anyone who wonders whether he has any 
reason to suppose he is generally right about the nature of his environment, must 
know what a belief is, and how in general beliefs are to be detected and interpreted . . 
. . All that is needed is that he recognize that belief is in its nature veridical.107 
The point I distill from Davidson's difficult (yet illuminating) paper is that correspondence, 
meaning, and belief are each mutually dependent, much in the same way as the propositions in the 
theory that Davidson is arguing for, and furthermore, that these mutually dependent relationships 
cannot exist without causality; only if meanings and beliefs are caused by something do they yield 
correspondence. The problem with this view should be obvious: it assumes that there  are causes, 
and if Davidson is to support the claim that such causes exist, he must presumably have evidence 
for his view. Unfortunately, Davidson provides no such evidence.  Furthermore, Davidson's view 
does not allow for any such evidence, since Davidson, as has been noted, does not allow for the 
possibility of any justificatory or evidential relation between a belief and reality. Hence, Davidson's 
view is not only unsupported, but contradictory.
I am certainly not the first to note the failure of Davidson's argument; Davidson himself 
admitted to it five years after the publication of “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.”108 
He recanted not only the claim that coherence yields correspondence but the idea of correspondence 
altogether.109  It was Rorty who convinced Davidson that these were his views—that, rather than 
104 Ibid., 128.
105 Ibid., 129.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Donald Davidson,  "Appendix:  Afterthoughts," in  The Essential  Davidson,  ed.  Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig 
(Oxford: UP, 2006), 238-241.
109 Ibid., 239.
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solving skepticism, he was merely ignoring it. Davidson acknowledged this and, in the end, found it 
preferable:
I agree with Rorty to this extent; I set out not to “refute” the skeptic, but to give a 
sketch  of  what  I  think  to  be  a  correct  account  of  the  foundations  of  linguistic 
communication and its implications for truth, belief, and knowledge. If one grants 
the correctness of this account, one can tell the skeptic to get lost.110
Thus,  Davidson,  reputed  for  the  constructive  views  presented  through  the  corpus  of  his 
philosophical writing, became an anti-realist.
In the past, I have also attempted to take on skepticism.111 I argued, first off, that there is no 
difference  between  methodological  and  philosophical  skepticism—that  in  either  context,  doubt 
means the same thing: suspending judgment about the truth of a proposition. I added to this the 
argument that it is impossible to doubt every single one of our beliefs, including certain beliefs  
about the external world.112 Finally,  I  argued that this  alone can be used to logically refute the 
skeptic's claim that our senses are unreliable, not to “kick over the lectern,” so to speak, but to 
actually prove skepticism unsound.113 I claimed that our senses were reliable, however, not that they 
yielded correspondence. In fact, I even conceded at the end of the argument that though our senses 
are reliable, it might still have been the case that knowledge of an external world was impossible—
bizarre  as  this  may have  sounded—but  that  Cartesian  skepticism failed  to  show how such  an 
impossibility could be.114
If it is true, as I think it is, that some of our beliefs are reliable, does it entail that truth 
requires correspondence with reality? The skeptic would say that it has to. I am still inclined to say 
that it does not have to, and that, in agreement with Rorty and perhaps even the logical positivists, 
the best test for reliability we can devise is coherence. However, I shall make some concessions on 
110 Ibid., 241.
111 Kevin  Powell,  "Skepticism and  Human  Psychology,"  Prometheus:  The  Johns  Hopkins  University  Journal  of  
Undergraduate Philosophy 2 (2010):  3-11. By juxtaposing my own work with Davidson's,  I  do not pretend to 
compare my own with the rigor and ingenuity of his; I only wish to note briefly my own views on skepticism,  
which, if laid out more thoroughly, would go well beyond the scope of this paper.
112 Ibid., 5-8.
113 Ibid., 9-10.
114 Ibid., 10.
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this matter.
4.ii. The Appeal of Coherentism in Ethics
Before even making these concessions, however, I wish to discuss some intuitions about 
why it might be appealing to employ a coherence theory of both truth and knowledge (I shall have 
to occasionally vacillate between discussing one or the other) to moral philosophy. The theories I 
have discussed in the previous section are all concerned predominately with empirical knowledge. 
Still, I see no reason why the problems they deal with are any less relevant to moral knowledge. 
Fundamentally, both kinds of knowledge concern propositions—statements about what is true or 
false, is or is not—and therefore require justification. In this regard, a coherence theory might be 
just as relevant to ethics as it is to empirical knowledge (and, potentially, just as problematic).
But, problems aside, the reason I believe a coherence theory in ethics is appealing is because 
of our desire for consistency in our moral lives. We want morals that we can endorse and act upon  
without contradiction. After all, when we feel a sense of guilt or self-blame, more often than not, we 
feel that way because we have done something we knew was incongruous with our other moral 
beliefs—to wit, because we have acted hypocritically. We do not feel that way because we realize 
that our moral beliefs were false at the time we acted. Our moral practices and beliefs are often 
worked out not through the attainment of foundational or self-justifying facts, but through cognitive 
dissonance: when we realize that we have done, desire to do, or believe something inconsistent with 
our other moral beliefs, we are called upon to resolve the internal quarrel with ourselves that results. 
More often than not, we settle that quarrel with weak excuses. We sometimes even acknowledge 
that they are excuses yet still choose to make them. But in other cases, we may actually rise to the 
occasion and recognize that our moral framework contains a logical contradiction that must be 
resolved. In this respect, I think that a coherence theory in ethics speaks strongly to ordinary moral 
experience.
John Rawls understood the importance of coherence in practical moral life, which led to his 
coinage of the term “reflective equilibrium.” Rawls' idea, very (very) roughly, is that moral and 
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political discourse among members of a community begins with a set of assumptions about what 
principles count as just.115  The justification of these assumptions is routinely called into question 
when an occasion demands it; when this occurs, the members of a community need to engage in a 
process of deliberation about which principles are most rational.116
By  going  back  and  forth,  sometimes  altering  the  conditions  of  the  contractual 
circumstances,  at  others  withdrawing  our  judgments  and  conforming  them  to 
principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation 
that  both  expresses  reasonable  conditions  and yields  principles  which  match  our 
considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.117
Rawls' remarks here on reflective equilibrium incorporate several of his other assumptions. First, 
Rawls  places  the  demand for  reflective  equilibrium within  a  community that,  presumably,  has 
already adopted a social contract. Second, he discusses reflective equilibrium as a process which 
settles principles of justice. Finally, he notes that reflective equilibrium need not always result in a 
change of these principles, but may sometimes result in a change of the material circumstances that 
brought about the need for reflection to begin with.
I  believe  that  we  may  incorporate  elements  of  Rawls'  theory  of  reflective  equilibrium 
without assuming that the method must take place in the circumstances Rawls describes (and I do 
not claim that he argues otherwise). I believe that at the core of reflective-equilibrium theory is 
simply the idea that our set of moral beliefs may be altered, e.g., by rejecting some of those beliefs  
(and  thereby  accepting  their  negations)  or  by  accepting  new  ones  that  had  previously  been 
unconsidered.  These  moral  beliefs  need  not  necessarily  be  limited  to  principles,  but  may also 
include evaluations—ascriptions of value. In this respect, the idea of reflective equilibrium seems 
amenable to a coherence theory of moral knowledge. As Geoffrey Sayre-McCord comments,
[t]he practical value of the method is reflected in the fact that most effective forms of 
moral argumentation appear to work by revealing to people that their own views 
need  shoring  up  or  changing  if  those  views  are  to  cohere  with  others  they  are 
unwilling to jettison.118
115 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999), 11-12.
116 Ibid., 16.
117 Ibid., 18.
118 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory," in Moral Knowledge?, ed. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong and Mark Timmons (Oxford: UP, 1996),  10.
   50
Thus,  coherentism within moral  epistemology is  relevant  not  only to  the domain of  an agent's  
private  set  of  beliefs,  but  to  the  public  domain  as  well,  and,  in  this  respect,  is  discursive.  
Furthermore,  it  construes  justification  as  something that  varies  by degree  and which by nature 
involves a process of continual revision. These facts are enough to compel me to adopt it.
4.iii. Concessions
At the end of 4.i., I claimed that I might accept Rorty's view that coherence is all that matters 
for justification and that we should give up talk of a real world completely, effectively telling the 
skeptic to “get lost.” How far should we take this view? Should we side with Rorty and abandon the 
idea of a real world on practical grounds? Perhaps, but only if this move were in fact practical, 
which  might  not  be  the  case.  We  must  at  least  allow  for  meaningful  talk  of  a  real  world—
meaningful in the sense that we can speak about something when we claim that it is real. Though 
the attempt to rigorously and definitively prove the existence of the external world might be an 
artifact of the Cartesian tradition in philosophy, normal discourse still seems to depend on some sort 
of conception of real things. Thus, my concession, ironically, requires me to put forth some sort of 
positive view.
I also think that my earlier remarks on the idea of truth-selective faculties demand that I at  
least briefly confront the dilemma between realism and anti-realism. For the very idea of a truth-
selective faculty like perception or sentiment implies a causal relationship. But to maintain that such 
a casual relationship takes place between ourselves and a supposedly external world requires that 
we justify the existence of that external world. If we fail to do so, then we shall fall into precisely  
the same trap as Davidson when he wrote “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.” Let us 
see if we can somehow work around this problem.
Davidson's error in “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” led to a position that 
could be described roughly as anti-realist. I am not crazy about this term, nor do I particularly like 
its antonym, “realism,” at least not as it is typically employed. Realism is the view that there is a 
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genuinely external world of the kind that skeptics think we must demonstrate in order to possess 
any knowledge. Anti-realism refers to a broad set of views that hold that there is no such world, that 
talk of such a world is meaningless, or that such talk is, at the very least, pointless. I suppose that if 
I had to choose a side, it would be anti-realism. Yet I believe that the term is misleading; the anti-
realist need not deny that humans have a substantial and often very rich concept of an external  
world, and that the concept is most certainly real. So perhaps a better name for my view would be 
something along the lines of “representational realism.”119 The idea is that our experience of the 
world comprises mental representations and that those representations exist. Such representations 
are mind-dependent, at least necessarily. If in fact if there is an external world, then possession of a 
mind is not sufficient for us to have those representations; there must be some source of input that 
allows us to form them. Yet absolute knowledge of things-in-themselves is not necessary in order to 
agree that those representations exist and can be meaningfully employed by us. Hence, I choose to 
use the term “realism.” Though it might not be the traditional usage, it does imply that there are real 
things. A comparison with projectivism might help explain the idea I am trying to describe: whereas 
the projectivist construes our experience of the world as something that is projected upon or, to use 
Hume's terminology, “gilds and stains” some sort of antecedent structure—a wall, for instance—
representational realism is better captured with the analogy of a hologram that is displayed in three-
dimensional space and which constitutes the structure itself.
I have already described some elements of this view in 3.ii. On the representational-realist 
view, the world can be likened to a sort of map or guide, one that is continually drawn and edited in 
order  to  better  assimilate  new information  (perceptions,  for  example).  Novel  information  often 
requires us to modify our concepts of things, and our concepts establish the conditions by which we 
recognize, identify, and, in short, make sense of the various objects and entities of which we have 
concepts. New concepts modify what we mean when we speak of those things, and meanings have 
119 This term has been used to describe other philosophical views, though I am not drawing on any of them, nor am I  
familiar with them.
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implications for both the sentences in which we employ them and for the beliefs that we have about 
those sentences.120  The beliefs that we have therefore require that certain conditions be met—if I 
am to believe that there is a tennis ball on the floor, I must perceive a thing that is light green, three  
dimensional, has two white grooves, feels velvety, appears to be on the floor, and so on. If these  
conditions are met, then, for all intents and purposes, the belief is true.
The belief, however, depends on numerous other beliefs. For instance, I must believe that 
there is a floor. To believe that there is a floor, I need to believe that the thing I am standing on is 
level and that it be opposite to the ceiling and perpendicular to the walls. This, in turn, requires that 
I believe a host of things about my body, the walls, the ceilings, and so on and so forth; an entire 
network of beliefs must exist if I am to believe even the mere proposition that there is a tennis ball 
on the floor. And if I am to regard that belief as true largely by reference to other beliefs, then, for 
all intents and purposes, I am relying on a coherence theory of truth.
How is  this  view different  from Rorty's?  Perhaps it  is  not.  But  it  is  an attempt to  help 
alleviate the feeling of emptiness that Rorty's position might evoke, and to show why it is practical 
to speak of things as though they existed in some sense or another. Representational realism allows 
for the possibility that our language refers to things, and it allows for the idea that we have truth-
selective faculties, assuming that there is a connection between faculties such as perception and our 
coherent set of beliefs. The point of representational realism is to show that even if there is no world 
to be proven, there is nevertheless a world to be understood, and that as long as it is possible for our  
sentences to mean things and for our beliefs to be more or less coherent, then such understanding is 
possible.
One objection needs to be considered, then we shall move on. The objection is the problem 
of relativism. If, hypothetically, two agents may hold completely coherent and yet contradictory sets 
of beliefs, then a coherence theory of truth must render all of those beliefs true, effectively violating 
the principle of contradiction and resulting in a  reductio-ad-absurdum.  Representational realism 
120 I am silent, however, on the question of whether all beliefs are propositional.
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might  ignore the problem of an external  world,  but are  we prepared to ignore the principle  of 
contradiction as well? My reply is as follows:
If one is to devise a hypothetical situation in which two agents hold conflicting but coherent  
sets of beliefs,  I feel  one should be required to provide an example,  not merely claim that the 
scenario is conceivable. Such an example must enumerate the propositions that each agent believes, 
and those propositions must be mutually supportive in the way the coherentist prescribes. But a 
person's number of beliefs is immense, so much so that it might be beyond anyone's ability to list all  
of them. One might try to list a small yet coherent set of beliefs to support the thought-experiment,  
but I believe such an attempt would fail. The beliefs in the set must be mutually supportive, i.e., the 
set must be recursive, and it must include every single belief to which the members in the set are 
logically connected. It seems impossible to attempt this without ending up with a vast number of 
beliefs. Merely arguing that the hypothetical situation is conceivable, I think, is not enough. The 
situation must also be imaginable.
My position  with  regard  to  relativism is  to  therefore  remain  agnostic  about  it.  Even  if  
relativism is a threat in hypothetical situations, I doubt it is a threat among real people. No one, I 
believe,  possesses  a  completely coherent  set  of beliefs.  Coherence is  such as  to  allow that  the 
greater it is, the more reasonable it is to assume that most of what one believes is true. Given that  
people, inevitably, overlap in most of their beliefs, I do not think the threat posed by the thought-
experiment is terribly urgent.
4.iv. Sentiment, Coherentism, and Values
The motives behind my view might be called metaphilosophical. I do not regard skepticism 
as a worthy philosophical  problem to refute,  nor do I  think it  needs to be solved if  we are to 
understand why things are the way they are. This project, ultimately, is an attempt to find a more 
practical, workable alternative to intrinsic value for environmental ethics, and I believe that the 
pragmatic standpoint I have taken, along with the theory of justification that it embraces, is the key 
to finding that alternative. I wish now to discuss how coherentism is instrumental to determining 
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what things are valuable. I have made a distinction between evaluations (beliefs about what is good 
or bad, valuable or disvaluable) and directives (beliefs about what one ought and ought not to do). I 
have  argued  that  if  we are  to  solve  moral  disputes,  then  in  some cases,  we  need  to  examine 
evaluations rather than directives.  Two people may hold conflicting evaluations and yet still  be 
perfectly rational in holding conflicting directives. If George thinks endangered trees are valuable 
only instrumentally, it is reasonable for him to think they ought to be cut down for various purposes. 
If Jane things they are valuable as ends in themselves, then it is reasonable for her to think they 
ought to be protected. The roots of this dispute (no pun intended) lie in the fact that the two people 
have different evaluations. I now wish to argue how evaluations can be more or less justified in 
light of the coherence theory I have adopted and the idea that sentiment is a truth-selective faculty.
As a truth-selective faculty, sentiment tells us something about both ourselves and another 
object; it tells us how it makes sense to regard it and how to be motivated with regard to it. If the 
sentiment  is  deeply  positive,  such that  it  would  cause  shock  and  great  distress  for  me  to  see 
something harmed, then this is probably enough to incite the belief that it is morally worthy. The 
same probably applies if the idea of a thing's betterment or preservation calls forth my admiration or 
approval. Jane, for instance, would probably feel shocked to learn that George has cut down all the 
redwood trees. She would feel fulfilled knowing that the redwood trees are alive and flourishing. 
She therefore believes that redwood trees are good as ends in themselves.
Such beliefs, however, once they exist, have logical implications. They may require us to 
value  things  even  if  we  do  not  have  any  particular  sentiment  towards  them,  or  even  if  our 
sentiments towards them are negative. An analogy can be made with perception: I might see, for 
instance, that the campus center is next to the church. Once I am no longer near the campus center 
or the church, I still possess the belief that the former is next to the latter. Beliefs linger, even when  
the stimuli that brought them about are gone.
In the remainder of this section, I wish to show how justification in values121 involves a 
121 From this point on, I shall be using the term "values" interchangeably with both "evaluations" and "value as an  
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certain state of equilibrium (to echo Rawls). To believe justifiably in the goodness or worthiness of 
something, the following two conditions are necessary: (1) the belief must be coherent with other 
evaluations and (2) the belief cannot be repugnant to our sentiments. I would add a third condition, 
that the belief must be inferentially connected to sentimentally formed beliefs, but I do not believe 
this is necessary, as I think that this is the case with any evaluation. Let me illustrate two simple 
examples about how both conditions work.
Example 1 - Suppose one adheres to some version of strong contractualism, one which regards as 
ends-in-themselves  only those  people who can contribute to  the common good of  society,  and 
which regards anything else as expendable or exploitable. We need not go into the details of why 
she believes this or how she arrived at this belief, but let's just assume that she holds it.
Let  us  now assume that  someone  raises  the  following  question  (a  famous  objection  to 
contractualism): “What about disabled persons? They cannot contribute to society.  Are they not 
ends  in  themselves,  and consequently,  might  we not  exploit  them?”  The  following  process  of 
deliberation then occurs: if our contractualist is to remain consistent with her initial belief, she must 
say yes. But the thought that we can do whatever we wish with disabled persons is repugnant to her, 
so condition (2) is violated. Therefore, she probably does regard disabled people as in some way 
worth our moral  attention,  so she needs to reconsider whether her version of contractualism is 
coherent  in  light  of  this  belief.  She  may  yet  find  some  way  to  justifiably  conclude  that 
contractualism is still right (it is a complex issue); on the other hand, she may have to reject it. The 
important  point,  however,  is  that  sentiment  can  be  used  to  reveal  that  there  is  a  possible 
inconsistency in her beliefs that needs to be resolved.
Example 2 - Suppose one thinks that all humans are ends in themselves, but feels great contempt for 
disabled people and regards them as worthless. She is then asked to explain how this belief  is 
compatible with the belief that all humans are ends in themselves. If she concedes that there is an 
end."
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inconsistency in her beliefs, then she is in violation of condition (1) and needs to either reject the 
view that all humans are ends-in-themselves and accept that some are not, or she needs to hold that 
people with disabilities are ends-in-themselves as well.
It seems that the first option is easier. But suppose, however, that she regards other things as 
good or  valuable  as  well:  she might,  in  addition,  hold that  things  like  equality,  tolerance,  and 
compassion are good—that the first represents a good ideal while the second and third represent 
virtues. She is now asked to justify her contempt for disabled people in light of these other beliefs, 
since they would seem to imply or require that all humans be regarded as worthwhile, and that her 
intolerance and callousness are bad and disvaluable. She now needs either to reject her beliefs in the 
goodness of equality, tolerance, and compassion, or concede that disabled persons are of value and, 
furthermore, that her attitude needs to be adjusted.
In this lengthy chapter, I have attempted to search for a way in which we can more or less 
confidently believe that our evaluations are true. Needless to say, epistemology is a difficult subject, 
and the conclusions I have arrived at might be somewhat bleak. Throughout his life, Rorty's project  
was,  in  large  part,  a  refutation  of  two-thousand  years  of  philosophical  literature  which  he 
characterized as an ongoing attempt to prove or demonstrate some kind of metaphysical realism 
without success. His only conclusion was to throw the idea of a real world out the window. The 
outcome of this move gives us reason to be both despondent and hopeful. We are understandably 
despondent upon learning that the goal of finding some sort of real world is an aspiration we must  
reject. On the other hand, we can be hopeful that, now that such an obstacle is out of the picture, we  
can pursue philosophical concerns that are more relevant to day-to-day life and social progress. 
Indeed, this was Rorty's goal.
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(5) The Metaphysics of Value
Thus far, I have been characterizing value in a largely non-metaphysical and perhaps even 
diminutive way. In chapter three, I almost tried to bypass the issue and argue that evaluations are 
just a part of—and nothing more than—how we decide what it is reasonable or desirable to do. I  
argued that a belief that something is good or worthwhile means something straightforward and 
unembellished: that the thing merits my moral attention.  If  the reader finds this dissatisfying,  I 
should note that there is a distinction between the psychology of value and the metaphysics of 
value.  I  have  been  working  largely  with  the  psychological  aspects.  Perhaps  addressing  the 
metaphysical side of things can help us form a more substantial concept of what value is.
I have already addressed some metaphysical concerns in previous chapters. For instance, I 
argued that it is not possible to understand how intrinsic value and moral motivation can share any 
causal relation, and I also argued that Regan's intrinsic-value theory seems to rely on a stringent 
notion of the correspondence theory of truth. In voicing my criticisms of noncognitivism, I also 
critiqued Blackburn's “projectivist” view of value, noting among other issues that it,  too—in no 
small part because of the noncognitivism it endorsed—relied on a correspondence theory as well. I 
have  already  rejected  the  latter,  along  with  the  kind  of  metaphysical  realism  it  assumes.  To 
compensate for this, I introduced the theory of representational realism, the idea that the world is  
better understood as a construction brought about by the way in which we apply our own concepts 
to the information we encounter in our day-to-day experience in order to form a meaningful picture 
of the world. The best way to address the metaphysics of value, I think, is to contextualize it within 
representational realism; it  is  a part  of the way in which we conceptualize—and perceive—the 
various things we encounter.
The resultant picture, I believe, construes value as another condition of how we understand 
things. When we make an evaluation about something, the property we attribute to it is added to our 
repertoire of various descriptions of that thing. Once we have done this, the motivational nature of  
value exerts a certain influence on us, affecting the way in which we judge, respond to, and relate to 
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various parts of the world. The map analogy is once again instructive; when we value things, not 
only does it affect how we perceive those things, but how we navigate and respond to those things. 
The  claim  that  we  “perceive”  value  is  a  metaphysical  one,  to  be  sure,  so  I  now  turn  to  an  
explanation of the nature and content of the supposed perception. In what follows, I consider two 
perspectives  on  the  metaphysics  of  value,  and  I  then  explain  why  I  find  them  amenable  to 
representational realism. I then address the kinds of properties which warrant our valuing attitudes 
and—at last—begin to break into the field of environmental ethics.
5.i. McDowell and the Secondary-quality Analogy
John  McDowell  has  famously  likened  values  to  secondary  qualities  such  as  color. 
McDowell's view construes values, like colors, as entirely extrinsic properties, ones that are better 
placed  within  the  domain  of  phenomenology  than  in  an  objective  world  of  intrinsic  features. 
McDowell notes that to posit values as “brutely and absolutely there” requires us to subscribe to 
some sort of ethical intuitionism, the notion that moral facts or properties can be known without any 
explicable relation between the agent and the facts or properties themselves.122 The problem, on 
McDowell's view, is not merely that intuitionism seems to fail to explain the epistemic relation 
between agents and values, but that it also construes values as primary qualities, inherent in objects 
and independent of us. McDowell asks rhetorically why we simply cannot replace the primary-
quality model with a secondary-quality one. 123
The  context  in  which  McDowell  raises  this  question  involves  an  argument  with  John 
Mackie, the philosopher who coined the term “error theory” (the view that there are no objective 
values and that all moral statements are false). Mackie is dubious that the secondary-quality analogy 
refutes  his  aforementioned  theory.  As  McDowell  explains,  Mackie  likens  secondary-quality 
perception to a “projective error,” the error being that we tend to conceive of secondary qualities as 
though they were primary qualities.124  For example, we tend to regard things we perceive as red as 
122 McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," 202.
123 Ibid., 202.
124 Ibid.
   59
really red, even if we are not there to see them. On Mackie's view, if we were to take the same 
stance  towards  value,  we  would  end  up  making  the  same  mistake.  Thus,  likening  values  to 
secondary qualities is a doomed enterprise, according to Mackie.125
McDowell,  however,  believes  that  Mackie's  take  on  secondary-quality  experiences  “is 
seriously mistaken.”126 McDowell's subsequent goal is to demonstrate how we can conceive of the 
persistence of secondary qualities without falling into the “projective error” described by Mackie. 
According to McDowell,  a secondary quality (redness, for example) is  possible in virtue of an 
object being such as to look red, even when the observer is not there and that this is enough to call it 
red: “What would one expect it to be like to experience something's being such as to look red, if not  
to experience the thing in question (in the right circumstances) as looking, precisely, red?”127 
Mackie,  on the other hand, claims that to ascribe redness to an object is  to erroneously 
ascribe a completely objective property; for example, to ascribe redness to something is to say that 
it would be qualitatively red even if nobody were around to observe it.128 This is no doubt an absurd 
claim, but Mackie nevertheless maintains that we make such a claim when we ascribe any property 
to something, even perceptual properties like color. McDowell calls Mackie's position “naive” and 
doubts that this projective error is necessary for us to conceive of secondary qualities.129 According 
to  McDowell,  Mackie's  error  is  that  he  defines  “objective”  as  “there  to  be  experienced,”  and 
“subjective” as “being a mere figment of the subjective state that purports to be an experience of it.”
130 This  results  in  the  assumption  that  primary qualities  are  real  while  secondary qualities  are 
illusions.  McDowell,  on  the  other  hand,  thinks  we  should  understand  secondary  qualities  as 
“qualities  not  adequately  conceivable  except  in  terms  of  certain  subjective  states,  and  thus 
subjective themselves in a sense that that characterization defines.”131 In contrast, a primary quality 
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid 203.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
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should be understood as “objective in the sense that what it is for something to have it can be 
adequately understood otherwise than in terms of dispositions to give rise to subjective states.”132 
McDowell  believes  that  by making this  distinction,  the  confusion  implicit  in  Mackie's  view is 
resolved.
Having made that distinction, McDowell then likens values to secondary qualities as he has 
construed them; subjective experiences brought about by features or properties of an object and 
which  are  to  be  understood  partly  in  terms  of  that  object's  propensity  to  bring  about  those 
experiences, properties which we can assume persist in our absence. “Values are not brutely there,” 
explains McDowell, “any more than colors are: though, as with the colors, this does not stop us 
supposing that they are there independently of any particular apparent experience of them.”133 Thus, 
we can practically and effectively conceive of things as being valuable, or worth valuing, even 
when we are not around.
However, McDowell notes an important difference between values and mundane qualities 
like colors. It is usually enough to say that the relation between an object and an experience like 
color is a  causal  one. But in the case of value, notes McDowell, this analogy is just not strong 
enough.  We need to  conceive  of  the  object  not  merely that  it  is  such as  to  cause our  valuing 
experience,  “but  rather  such as  to  merit  it.”134 Hence,  it  would follow from this  that  we must 
conceive of objects as not only valuable in our absence, but also as in some way worthy of our 
valuation due to certain features or properties. Is a theory of intrinsic value about to muscle its way 
back into the picture? This question I shall get to in the course of this chapter.
5.ii. Wiggins and Sensible Subjectivism
David Wiggins gives an account of value similar to that of McDowell's; it relies on the idea 
that things are valuable if they are such as to elicit the right kind of experiences from us. Wiggins,  
however, unlike McDowell, gives sentiment an important role in his account. Wiggins' account is 
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., 208.
134 Ibid., 207.
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presented  alongside  an  objection  to  noncognitivism,  emotivism  in  particular.  The  emotivist, 
explains Wiggins, argues that claims such as “x is good” or “x is right” or “x is beautiful” mean that 
the speaker approves of  x or that  x  brings about “a certain sentiment of approbation” within the 
speaker.135 Wiggins wants to steer away from this view and towards a view that, firstly, specifies the 
conditions  rather  than  the  meaning  of  goodness,  and,  secondly,  is  cognitivist.  Wiggins  argues 
instead  that  a  better  account  of  “good,”  “right”  or  “beautiful”  involves  conditions  rather  than 
semantics, and prefers to say that “x  is good/right/beautiful if and only if  x  is such as to make a 
certain sentiment of approbation appropriate.”136 (A certain sentiment of approbation is of course 
distinct  from  any  sentiment  of  approbation.  Finding  something  beautiful  or  finding  it  good 
presumably involve different kinds of sentimental responses.)
Like McDowell, Wiggins draws an analogy between values and colors.137 However, and like 
McDowell, Wiggins takes the analogy beyond the merely phenomenal aspects of color and includes 
a description of the dispositional features of the object: “x is red if and only if x is such as to give, 
under certain conditions specifiable as normal, a certain visual impression . . . .”138 Wiggins then 
considers why this  should occur in  the case of values.  He rejects  Hume's view that  values are 
“merely phantasms of the feelings, or gildings or stainings with the colours borrowed from internal 
sentiment,” for, argues Wiggins, were this the case, then we could never refer to the actual objects 
or properties themselves when discussing good or bad taste or moral judgment.139 Rather, Wiggins 
argues that there is something about the nature of the object—some feature or set of features—
designed to call forth our sentiment.140 This, assumes Wiggins, is the proper condition upon which 
we may call something good (or right, beautiful, valuable, and so on).
135 David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism" in Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, 
and Peter Railton (New York: Oxford UP, 1997), 227.
136 Ibid., 228.
137 Ibid., 229.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., 231.
140 Ibid.
   62
5.iii. Appropriate Sentiments and Meriting Value
The views put forward by McDowell and Wiggins can both be described as “sensibility 
theories,” and both are similar in the following respects: they construe value as a mind-dependent 
and subjective phenomenon, yet they argue that we can reasonably call things valuable even when 
they are not there to be experienced. Both philosophers support this argument with the claim that 
those objects possess properties which bring about our evaluative responses and that for a person to 
state that an object is good or valuable141 is, for all intents and purposes, to ascribe those properties 
to it. Finally, Both McDowell and Wiggins agree that there are certain things that merit, rather than 
merely bring about, those responses. How is this idea useful for representational realism?
Likening  our  conception  of  the  world  to  a  map  or  guide  goes  hand-in-hand  with  our 
tendency to attribute physical continuity to objects and to assume that some circumstances or states 
of affairs endure in our absence. The way in which McDowell and Wiggins characterize secondary 
qualities allows us to employ this idea without succumbing to the inconceivable metaphysical view 
that the secondary qualities we perceive in things are there whether we apprehend them or not, and 
it also allows us to avoid the impractical, idealist view that objects cease to exist in our absence. Of 
course, one might at this point object that the idea of object-permanence assumes a correspondence 
theory of truth, but I do not think this necessarily follows. For the sense in which I am employing 
the term “exist” is not the same sense that the skeptic uses when she tells us that we need to prove 
the existence of an external world. When we say that things in the external world exist, it is better to 
assume that we are speaking either of what we perceive or what we can anticipate perceiving given 
certain conditions, with varying degrees of justification.
However,  the  claim  that  certain  things  “merit”  our  valuing  responses,  or  that  it  is 
“appropriate” to value them, raises a puzzle. For “merit” and “appropriate” are themselves both 
evaluative terms. What are we to say now? Have we committed ourselves to a sort of regress—that 
to effectively claim that “x is good” is to say that “it is good to regard x as good” or that “one should 
141 Or right or beautiful or worthy and so on.
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regard x as good?”
Both McDowell and Wiggins treat the question as one which must resolve itself through 
discourse,  one which is,  in  many ways,  open.  McDowell  assumes,  for  lack of  a more feasible 
alternative,  that finding the standards by which to rationally judge something as worthy of our 
valuing attitudes is, in the end, “a search for a  theory  of beauty or goodness.”142 “I take it,” he 
writes, “that my hunch poses a question for moral and aesthetic taste, which—like other questions 
of taste—should be capable of being argued about.”143 Similarly,  Wiggins writes of the kind of 
sentiment aroused in us by certain things that
it  counts  as  nothing  less  than  an  act  of  judging  a  content;  it  is  a  judgment 
indispensably sustained by the perceptions and feelings and thoughts that are open to 
criticism that is based on norms that are open to criticism. It is not that by which we 
tell. It is part of the telling itself.144
Hence, according to both McDowell and Wiggins, the faculties by which we perceive values 
are by no means infallible, nor is our assumption that they are the right faculties. I agree. As I said 
in chapter three, my theory that sentiment is a truth-selective faculty is just that: a theory, one that is 
based on the most plausible role that I could provide for sentiment in a scheme of moral motivation. 
Since it is a theory,  we have the following privileges: first,  we may question the scheme itself. 
Second, we may question the extent to which sentiment should constrain our beliefs about what is 
valuable  (as  I  argued  in  chapter  four,  our  sentiments  can  be  overruled  by concerns  related  to 
coherence). Finally, even if the scheme is right, we may ask ourselves which kind of sentiments it  
makes sense to cultivate and where they are best directed. Such matters are not out of our hands, 
and nothing is immune to second thoughts.
5.iv. What Are the Appropriate Properties?
What kinds of properties merit our admiration or approval? One view is that to consider 
something valuable as an end in itself involves valuing it for its intrinsic properties—if an agent 
finds that something is worthy of admiring, preserving, or promoting, it is because of the thing's 
142 McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," 209.
143 Ibid., 209.
144 Wiggins, "Sensible Subjectivism," 238.
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intrinsic  properties  that  the  agent  regards  it  this  way.  Perhaps this  is  what  is  meant  when one 
suggests that to value something intrinsically is to value it “in itself” or “for its own sake”; it means 
valuing it for what it is, not for its contingent relations with other things. Shelly Kagan has argued 
strongly against this view through the use of several counterexamples. Kagan cites instances in 
which one may value something as an end for reasons other than its intrinsic properties. Uniqueness 
is one such example; people tend to value things that are rare or precious. “Obviously enough, 
however, uniqueness is not a property that an object has independently of whatever else may exist  
in the world; it is a relational property, rather than being an intrinsic one.”145 We might also value 
things   for  their  causal  properties:  Kagan  has  us  imagine  “an  elegantly designed  racecar,  one 
capable of driving at extraordinary speeds while still handling with ease.”146 Someone might very 
well value such a car as an end; “they might think the world is better off . . . for the existence of 
such a car; they might think they have reason to bring such a car into existence, or to preserve or 
care for it.”147 Nevertheless, Kagan reminds us, the person values the car at least in part for a causal 
property—its speed—which is an extrinsic property.148 Even instrumental value might factor into 
our valuing something as an end: to use two other examples from Kagan, we may value someone 
very talented in the culinary arts, or we may value the pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the 
Emancipation Proclamation.149 If Kagan's counterexamples are sound (and I think they are), then 
certainly one can value something as an end in virtue of its extrinsic properties.
Christine Korsgaard has also argued that we may value things as ends for their extrinsic—
and, in particular, instrumental—properties. Korsgaard has us imagine a mink coat: “One hardly 
wants to say that it is valuable only as a means, to keep the cold out.” Yet, adds Korsgaard, “it is 
also odd to say that it is valued simply for its own sake. A coat is essentially instrumental: were it 
not for the ways in which human beings respond to cold, we would not care about them or ever  
145 Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value," 283.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., 283-284
149 Ibid., 284-286
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think about  them.”150 Korsgaard's  point  is  that  a  thing's  instrumental  value may factor  into our 
valuing it as an end: “Mink coats and handsome china and gorgeously enameled frying pans are all  
things that  human beings might  choose partly for their  own sakes under the condition of their 
instrumentality: that is, given the role such things play in our lives.”151
It is easy to imagine other examples of things that we might value as ends due to their 
extrinsic properties. Beautiful artworks are one example; we may regard them as worth preserving 
as ends in themselves, even if in part because of the aesthetic beauty they have for us (an extrinsic 
property, on my view). So are family members; one may value her spouse for his emotional support, 
attractiveness, and contributions to the household income, yet still value him as an end, even though 
the attributes just described are extrinsic properties. A dog may be valued as an end in part for the 
shared enjoyment and bonding it promotes among family members. The list goes on; it is plain that 
to value something as an end is by no means to value it only for its intrinsic properties.
It would be largely futile to come up with a list of every single property that somehow 
merits or yields our valuation. One reason for this is because the list is not fixed; the discursive 
method by which we determine what is of value means that the items on the list are dynamic and 
tentative. Furthermore, the sort of subjectivist view I espouse means that the contents of the list 
differ across cultures and among individuals to varying degrees. Another reason why the endeavor 
is futile is because it would be highly impractical to describe some of these properties without using 
evaluative language. Take, for example, the Grand Canyon. I may value it as an end in part because 
it  is  beautiful.  Yet  “beautiful”  is  itself  an evaluative  term,  and to  try and seek some reductive 
description  of  the  attributes  that  contribute  to  its  beauty would be a  bizarre  endeavor.  Does it  
include the canyon's width? Its length? Its colors? The sounds one hears as she stands out over the 
canyon? The same thing goes for people who really appreciate horses. Are we to list the possession 
of hooves as a feature which merits valuation, or the approximate number of hairs on a horse's body, 
150 Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions," 185.
151 Ibid.
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or the top speed at which a horse gallops? Is it some combination of these? The endeavor, as we can 
quickly see, becomes both an uninteresting and unpromising one.
Fortunately, I think it is an unnecessary endeavor. There are ways to discover and determine 
what attributes might merit valuing responses without merely listing them; indeed, this is a rather 
unconstructive way to actually reveal  the import  and potential  such features  have for  our own 
attitudes. The best method is to show someone, not to tell her, what those features are. Consider the 
following two passages. Both list certain properties of things that might merit our own approbation, 
yet they do so holistically, not reductively, and in highly evocative language. The first passage is by 
Dale Jamieson:
Many people  think  of  deserts  as  horrible  places  that  are  not  worth  protecting.  I 
disagree. I value deserts intrinsically152 and think you should too. How do I proceed? 
One  thing  I  might  do  is  take  you  camping  with  me.  We might  see  the  desert's 
nocturnal inhabitants, the plants that have adapted to these conditions, the shifting 
colors of the landscape as the day wears on, and the rising of the moon on the stark 
features of the desert. Together we might experience the feel of the desert wind, hear 
the silence of the desert, and sense its solitude.153
In this  passage,  Jamieson demonstrates how calling someone's attention to certain features of a 
desert might produce a sentiment of approbation and bring about the belief that it is valuable. The 
features  described  by Jamieson  are  not  communicated  in  reductionistic  terms,  but  through  an 
integrated combination of experiences that might lead to novel insights about how it makes sense to 
care about a desert. The passage also shows how these features may be illuminated or called to one's 
attention through a process of communication, shared perceptions, and guidance; by being in the 
company of someone who is aware of certain features that I may have taken for granted—or that I 
might have acknowledged but failed to consider in a certain way—those features may be called to 
my attention, and my concept of what a desert is may be subsequently modified. Likewise, the 
passage shows how different kinds of value—aesthetic value and value as an end—may overlap.
Consider another passage from an anonymous personal narrative related by Karen Warren:
152 Here, Jamieson is using the term "value intrinsically" to mean the same thing as "value as an end."
153 Jamieson, Morality's Progress, 237.
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On my second day of climbing, I rappelled down from about 200 feet from the top of 
the Palisades at Lake Superior to just a few feet above the water level. I could see no 
one—not my belayer, not the other climbers, no one. I looked all around me—really 
looked—and listened. I heard a cacophony of voices—birds, trickles of water on the 
rock before me, waves lapping against the rocks below. I closed my eyes and began 
to  feel  the  rock with  my hands—the  cracks  and  crannies,  the  raised  lichen  and 
mosses,  the almost imperceptible nubs that  might  provide a resting place for my 
fingers and toes when I began to climb. At that moment I was bathed in serenity. I 
began to talk to the rock in an almost inaudible, child-like way, as if the rock were 
my friend.  I  felt  an  overwhelming sense  of  gratitude  for  what  it  offered  me—a 
chance to know myself and the rock differently, to appreciate the unforeseen miracles 
like the tiny flowers growing in the even tinier cracks on the rock's surface, and to 
come to know the sense of  being in  a relationship  with the environment.  .  .  .  I 
realized then that I had come to care about this cliff which was so different from me, 
so unmovable and invincible, independent and seemingly indifferent to my presence.
154
By being  made  aware  of  certain  features  of  the  rock  that  she  had  previously overlooked,  the 
protagonist  in  Warren's  narrative  finds  herself  feeling a  strong sentiment  towards  the  rock that 
manifests  itself  as a profound feeling of care,  affection,  and humility.  These features include a 
combination  of  sensible  properties:  sounds  and  textures.  They  also  include  an  instrumental 
property: “the almost imperceptible nubs that might provide a resting place for my fingers and toes 
when I began to climb.” The narrator begins to appreciate the rock in a new way and subsequently 
experiences a paradigm shift; she regards the rock as good for its own sake, not merely for its 
recreational value.
Thus,  the  metaphysical  question  of  which  properties  of  things  merit  our  admiration, 
approbation,  and  evaluation  is  best  answered  through  experience,  not  by  meticulously  listing 
necessary and sufficient conditions. The properties are those that belong to things with which we 
are uniquely situated,  things  which might  be able  to  evoke our appreciation and admiration in 
particular and unique ways. As we engage in this process, we gradually come to develop a more 
complete picture of what things are good for their own sake. As these pictures develop, they are 
exchanged among individuals through a process of discourse, and gradually become embodied in a 
dynamic and contestable set of conventions and frameworks. The answer therefore recommends a 
154 Warren, "The Power and the Promise," 218.
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constructivist view of ethics.
Let us return to the question posed at the end of 5.i: if we are to say that being good or 
valuable entails that a thing is such as to bring about or merit a certain sentiment, then are we 
endorsing an intrinsic-value view? It does not appear so, for several reasons. First, this statement 
does not commit us to the view that the thing's value is intrinsic.  The valuing stances we take 
towards things do indeed depend on properties those things possess, but value is not one of them; 
value itself is still mind-dependent and therefore extrinsic. Furthermore, “being such as to bring 
about or merit a certain sentiment” is also an extrinsic property; it depends on a sort of potential or 
counterfactual relation between us and the object. Finally, as we have noted, many of the properties 
that might bring about our approbation are extrinsic properties: instrumental value, aesthetic value, 
causal relationships, uniqueness, and so on. With all this in mind, it is not the case that our valuation 
depends merely on a thing's intrinsic properties.
One final point worth noting is that if we are to value something as an end in part due to its 
instrumental value, then the means-end distinction has effectively been called into question. I do not 
perceive this  as  a  major  problem. The distinction  should be  questioned.  It  represents  a  sort  of 
dualistic mode of thinking which I think is better done away with, as it inaccurately reflects the way 
in which we are situated with regard to the world around us. We may value something as an end in 
part due to its value as a means, yet still not value ii as a mere means; this is a point I think we can 
reasonably agree on.
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Conclusion: A Lush World of Values
Throughout the preceding chapters, I have attempted to address several questions pertaining 
and peripheral to metaethics. My goal has been to find answers that compensated for the issues I  
took with Regan's intrinsic-value view. I began by noting that there was no way of explaining how 
the concept of intrinsic value could work as a source of moral motivation, so in chapter three, I 
attempted to devise a scheme of moral psychology, one that included both valuation and moral 
motivation and that could provide a place for sentiment without committing us to some sort of anti-
rational view of ethics. In chapter four, I showed how people can have different values while still 
being perfectly rational in holding conflicting directives, and I argued for the appeal of coherentism 
as a test for the truth and justification of those value-claims. I discussed the problems posed for 
epistemology by the demands of a correspondence theory of truth, and in response I sketched a 
metaphysical theory, representational realism, which I believe provides a pragmatic way of working 
around these problems. I then gave some brief examples of how a person's values and general moral 
framework can be modified by balancing sentimentally-formed evaluations with coherence in one's 
beliefs.  In  chapter  five,  I  discussed  the  metaphysics  of  value,  arguing  that  values  should  be 
understood as extrinsic properties, yet that they can also be spoken of as properties that persist in 
our absence in  that  they are both caused and merited by other  features  of an object.  Finally,  I 
argued, using examples, that whatever features qualify a thing for our valuation are best revealed 
through personal experience and interpersonal discourse.
Naturally, many of the views I have endorsed have ramifications outside of environmental 
ethics and moral philosophy in general; for instance, the coherentism I defended pertains no less to 
empirical  knowledge  than  it  does  to  moral  knowledge,  and  the  rational-internalist  view that  I 
endorsed  at  the  beginning  of  chapter  four,  if  true,  has  implications  for  action  theory.  I  have 
addressed these topics only in the interest of answering the question I posed at the outset of this  
project: can we defend a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic without defending a theory of 
intrinsic value? We are now equipped with all the tools I think necessary to produce a reply to that  
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question.
What  I  have  tried  to  defend  is  a  completely  holistic  take  on  how  values  are  to  be 
conceptualized,  justified,  and  developed,  rather  than  the  kind  of  linear  foundationalist  model 
assumed necessary in  Regan's  intrinsic-value view.  Values  are  not  fixed  and localized in  some 
particular  entity  or  class  of  entities;  rather,  they  are  artifacts,  generated  and  exchanged  both 
personally and interpersonally.  They play a role in how we form concepts of things, and those 
concepts influence how we perceive and represent those things: if I believe that redwoods are good, 
then when I  apprehend a particular  redwood, I  perceive it  as good.  There is  something in  my 
concept of a redwood that might not be present in yours, so that to me, a redwood seems different 
than it does to you. If I can get you to assimilate my concept of a redwood, then it will  seem 
different to you as well.
There is no easy answer to how I go about convincing you that my view on redwoods is 
right.  For one thing,  I  need to demonstrate to you that my faculties of value-discernment—my 
“sensibilities,” as it were—are reliable and functional. I need to reveal to you in some way what it is  
about redwoods that I perceive by means of those sensibilities. I need you to realize that my concept 
of a redwood tree as good as an end is more coherent than a concept which omits this quality. You 
and I need to compare our large sets of beliefs and assumptions, seeing what many differences exist 
that lead to our discrepant beliefs. These steps are not necessarily pursued in that order; indeed, 
some  are  required  for  the  others.  For  instance,  showing  you  that  my sensibilities  are  reliable 
requires me to show you that my evaluative beliefs are coherent, and getting you to agree that I  
form generally coherent evaluations requires me to demonstrate that my sensibilities are reliable. In 
the process, I do the same: I learn about your sensibilities, your own values, and the warrant with  
which you hold them. In the process, both our common ground and our disagreements are exposed. 
Discourse about values is not an easy process, nor should it be, and it is unrealistic to demand 
otherwise. A person's values cannot be changed by a few deft strokes of a philosopher's pen; the 
process requires time, experience, and, more often than not, luck.
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A question now probably on the reader's mind is what kind of environmental ethic the view I 
have developed attaches itself to. Does it grant moral standing merely to sentient animals, those 
capable of pain, perhaps, or those that can be called “subjects of a life”? Is it a kind of biocentric 
view, one that attributes moral standing to all living things, animal, plant, and unicellular? If so, is it  
individualist—does it consider only individual organisms valuable—or is it holistic, ascribing that 
kind of value to collectives such as ecosystems and species? It is hierarchical or egalitarian? Does it  
place the interests of wild animals above those of domestic animals? Does it allow or even demand 
us to harm certain organisms to preserve ecosystemic integrity? Does it include nonliving or not  
entirely living objects, systems, or features under its purview—rocks, rivers, mountains, oceans, or 
the planet itself? Does it include celestial bodies like the moon? To what extent and with what 
priority  does  it  account  for  human  interests?  Is  it  deontological,  consequentialist,  rights-based, 
communitarian, a virtue ethic, theological, secular, or some combination of the above?
The answer is that my take on value implies none of these ethical views—or any particular  
ethical theory, for that matter, and, incidentally, that I myself am not certain where I stand with 
regard to these questions, save for a few scattered opinions, some of which I hold more trenchantly 
than others. The metaethical view that I have outlined in this project does not prescribe values; it 
describes them. Prescription is left up to people, who are free to make use of or neglect the full  
potential  of  their  evaluative  faculties  and  who  will  always  disagree  in  some  way  or  another. 
However, I will make the following remarks:
We value a diverse number of things, and in the end, I think our values point us in the 
direction of some sort of nonanthropocentrism. We value things that are beautiful and  things that 
are complex and diverse. We value things that can inspire in us feelings of delight, awe, terror, 
excitement,  wonder,  immersion,  tranquility,  and peace.  Many of  us  value things  that  grow and 
flourish, or else we would not have gardens in our back yards and potted plants in our houses, and 
many of us find ourselves intrigued by and deeply enjoy animals; some of us possess an uncanny 
ability to bond with them. Many of us value the new knowledge, experiences, and discoveries that 
   72
nature can provide us, or we would not study topics like biology, ecology, and natural history—nor 
would we adventure in wooded areas next to our towns and off of our campuses, sometimes by 
ourselves, in the hope of suddenly running into a deer or catching sight of a garter snake or a frog; 
nor would we climb trees for the novel sensation of looking down at things from above. We value 
things that are good instrumentally—that provide for us, and that play a helpful and nourishing role 
in  our  lives—though  not  necessarily  merely instrumentality.  We  value  character  traits  like 
sensitivity, compassion, and erudition, and we disvalue destructiveness, callousness, indifference, 
and ignorance; we value ideas such as happiness and freedom, both in the abstract and as genuine 
experiences that make our lives richer, and we enjoy watching others experience these things as 
well. We value justice, tolerance, equality, nonviolence, friendship, and gratitude. We value nature 
not merely for intrinsic properties or features—if at all—but for its extrinsic properties as well, 
including the admiration and appreciation it evokes for us. All these things considered, we are quite 
capable of and indeed have good reason to value the nonhuman world, in some way or another, as 
an end in itself. And if we reflect on this, a purely anthropocentric ethic suddenly seems like not  
enough.
Perhaps sometimes—even oftentimes—we express our valuation the wrong ways—wrong, 
in that they are not the most prudent or most rational ways to act in accord with our values or that 
they are inconsistent with other values we hold. Our enjoyment of animals might lead us to keep 
them in cages in our houses or confined in zoos,  despite our appreciation of freedom, and our 
admiration for the wilderness might lead us to disrupt or erode natural habitats with gift shops and 
paved roads, despite our appreciation of integrity. But if it is the case that, in the end, we do value  
nature for its own sake in some way or another, then an ethic that construes the nonhuman world as 
more  than  just  a  mere  means  is  likely to  emerge  and  to  be  rationally  prescribed by our  own 
evaluative beliefs, and if we are rational, and take into account the needs, the integrity, and the 
teleology of the things we value, principles will emerge that fit those values.
It is considered tasteful to conclude things with a quotation, so I shall:
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No two trees are the same to Raven.
No two branches are the same to Wren. 
If what a tree or a bush does is lost on you, 
You are surely lost. Stand still. The forest knows 
Where you are. You must let it find you.155
155 David Wagoner, "Lost," in Riverbed (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1972), 75.
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Addendum: Act As If?
In his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant presents the second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative in the following words (or, I should say, their German equivalent): “Act as if 
the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.” 156 Those 
first three words, “act as if,” are of crucial importance to Kant's idea. It is not that Kant expects us 
to know for sure whether our maxim is, in fact, a law of nature, viz., a law whose legitimacy is in 
some way supported by demonstrably true facts  or  states of affairs  of  reality.  The implication, 
rather, seems to be that we cannot abide by the Categorical Imperative  unless we regard it as an 
objectively  true  law  of  nature.  Can  the  same  be  said  for  intrinsic  value?  Even  if  the  theory, 
ultimately, is not verifiable or even coherent, should we nevertheless act as if it were true in order to 
regard nonhuman beings—or any beings, for that matter—as morally significant? Could it even be 
that we cannot possibly regard something as though it has moral standing unless we believe that it 
possesses intrinsic value?
Paul Taylor has made certain remarks that might mean something to this effect. In “The 
Ethics of Respect for Nature,” he argues that in order for us to regard living things as entitled to our 
moral respect, we must abide by what he call the  attitude of inherent worth.157 “Indeed,” writes 
Taylor, “it is only because they [living things] are conceived in this way that moral agents can think 
of themselves as having validly binding duties, obligations, and responsibilities that are owed to 
them as their due.”158 Whether we can prove that such inherent worth exists is a question that does 
not interest Taylor. Similarly, Tom Regan's philosophy of animal rights relies on a theory of intrinsic 
worth which, throughout the corpus of his philosophical work, he calls “the postulate of inherent 
value” and which he assumes necessary if humans and nonhuman animals, namely, those who meet 
the “subject-of-a-life” criterion, possess moral rights. “To view certain individuals . . . as having 
156 Kant, Grounding, 30. As mentioned and cited on page 8, footnote 21 of this paper, the Formula of Humanity As an  
End is often called the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, when it is in fact the third.
157 Taylor, "Ethics of Respect," 127.
158 Ibid.
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equal inherent value is a postulate—that is, a theoretical assumption.”159 Regan does not endorse the 
claim that inherent value  follows from being the subject-of-a-life, nor does he attempt to prove 
where it does follow from. Rather, Regan is looking for a view that is coherent: if moral agents are 
to be treated as though they had moral standing, so should moral patients, and the postulate of 
inherent plausibly describes why.160
Both Regan and Taylor believe that a theoretical assumption of inherent value is needed if 
we are to regard any kind of being or entity as worth our moral consideration; to deny such an 
assumption just  seems impractical if we are to regard anything as morally considerable.  In this 
respect,  both  views  seem  to  remotely  resemble  the  idea  in  the  second  formulation  of  Kant's 
Categorical Imperative in that we must “act as if” certain claims are true if we are to be moral at all,  
even if those claims cannot be proven. What about my view? In 5.iii, I argued that although values 
are better likened to secondary rather than primary qualities, still we may speak of them in the same 
way that we speak of primary qualities in that the things which merit our approval do so because 
they are such as to do so, i.e., they possess qualities which bring about our approval, and therefore 
can be pragmatically described as valuable without any reference to secondary qualities. In saying 
this, have I, too, unwittingly recommended that we act as if a thing's value is intrinsic? Here is what 
I think:
First, I wish to return to the distinction made in chapter one between the two different senses 
of the phrase “intrinsic value.” Some philosophers, when they use the phrase, are using it  in a 
normative sense; they are referring to value that is noninstrumental, that is to say, value as an end 
rather than value as a means. Other philosophers use the phrase in a metaphysical sense to refer to 
value that is an intrinsic property of something, independent of any relations that the owner of the 
property might have to other things, so that if the object were the only thing in the universe, it  
would still possess intrinsic value. Some philosophers, of course, believe that intrinsic value is both 
159 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 247.
160 Ibid., 248.
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of these things. Others do not, or at least do not specify whether they endorse both senses of the 
term. The question this section of the paper addresses therefore turns out to be two questions. One is 
whether we must act as if something is good as an end if we are to respect it morally. The other  
question is whether we must act as if that thing possesses a metaphysical property of a certain kind.
Regan's idea of inherent value very explicitly includes the first sense of the term: value that 
is  independent  of  a  being's  utility.161 Nowhere  in  the  Case  for  Animal  Rights  does  he  discuss 
whether such value is an intrinsic or extrinsic property, though his remarks throughout “The Nature 
and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic” might imply that he would maintain as a necessary 
condition that the property be intrinsic. Paul Taylor is also silent on whether such a property is  
intrinsic or extrinsic, but rather, argues that anything with inherent value is “prima facie worthy of 
being  preserved  or  promoted.”  Both  philosophers  therefore  appear  to  abide  by  the  normative 
definition; they argue that in order to regard certain beings as morally considerable, we need to 
regard them as possessing inherent worth, even if such worth is only a postulate or attitude whose 
truth we assume theoretically rather than prove.
Can we regard  something as  morally  significant  without  using  terms  like  “intrinsic”  or 
“inherent” to describe its value, seeing as how such value is not necessarily an intrinsic or inherent 
property (I take the terms to mean the same thing)? Should we rather exchange it for a term like 
“value as an end” or “terminal value”? Shelly Kagan says no. Even though he argues that value as 
an end need not be an intrinsic property, he is hesitant to ditch the phrase in favor of another term 
and use “intrinsic value” only to describe value in the metaphysical sense. “I am not at all sure there 
is anything of interest that would be worth saving the label for. Meanwhile, a perfectly important  
category—value as an end—would go lacking a familiar and evocative label.”162 Do I agree with 
Kagan? I am reluctant to. If we retain the term “intrinsic” to describe something that is not an 
intrinsic property, then we run the risk of committing fallacies of equivocation. Philosophers may 
161 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, xxi-xxii.
162 Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value," 293.
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forget  which sense of the term they are using,  and critics  of intrinsic  value might  erroneously 
address views that employ the normative sense as though they employed the metaphysical sense. So 
I  am somewhat  hesitant  to  agree  with  Kagan's  claim.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  can  manage 
successfully  to  employ the  term to  mean  value  as  an  end  without  succumbing  to  fallacies  of 
equivocation, then I suppose we can use it. If we are to use the term merely to mean that something 
possesses value as an end, it goes without saying that I think we should and that we would need to.
What about the metaphysical sense of the term? Do I believe we can only regard things as 
morally significant if we believe that their value is an intrinsic rather than extrinsic property? In 
agreement with McDowell and Wiggins, I believe we can say that they “have” or “possess” value 
and that we can conceive of them as having or possessing it in our absence and in virtue of the fact 
that they are such to merit our approbation and, subsequently, our valuation. But I should like to 
point out two things: first, there is nothing contradictory in saying that a thing “has” or “possesses” 
an extrinsic property, and second, a thing's being such as to merit our valuation does not depend on 
intrinsic properties alone, as I argued in 5.iv. I think that we can acknowledge these facts and still  
very easily value things. I certainly do.
Furthermore, the everyday sense in which we call things valuable, worthwhile, or good does 
not, in my opinion, seem to involve claims about the metaphysics of those properties; nothing in the 
claim commits us to the view that its goodness is intrinsic. Generally,  when we call something 
good, we are using the term primitively to express nothing other than the view that the thing is  
worth caring about. So I think it is entirely possible to regard things as good in themselves without 
regarding that goodness as intrinsic—and that we generally do this.  The latter  is,  of course, an 
empirical claim, one whose truth is difficult and perhaps impossible to prove or research, but I think 
it to be plausible.
In any case, I do not think we need to “act as if” a thing's goodness is an intrinsic property in 
order to think it good. Of course, pragmatically speaking, when we say that a thing is good, we do 
believe it to be true, and we believe claims to the contrary to be false. I have argued that coherence 
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is the right test to apply to such claims, if not a difficult one, and that a correspondence theory of  
truth cannot help us with regard to this kind of matter. Still, in order to navigate and conceive of the  
world around us, we do have to conceive of it as objective or real independently of our thoughts and 
sensations, and if we are to think of a thing's value as real in this way, then we do need to act as if  
that were the case. If this means embracing the idea that such value is intrinsic, then perhaps a 
postulate or theory of intrinsic value is necessary. If so, then we have come full circle.
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